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Abstract 
 
The governance of infrastructure funding and financing at the city-region scale is a 
critical aspect of the continued search for mechanisms to channel investment into 
the urban landscape. In the context of the global financial crisis, austerity and 
uneven growth, national, sub-national and local state actors are being compelled to 
adopt the increasingly speculative activities of urban entrepreneurialism to attract 
new capital, develop ‘innovative’ financial instruments and models, and establish 
new or reform existing institutional arrangements for urban infrastructure 
governance. Amidst concerns about the claimed ‘ungovernability’ of ‘global’ cities 
and city-regions, governing urban infrastructure funding and financing has become 
an acute issue. Infrastructure renewal and development are interpreted as integral 
 2 
 
to urban growth, especially to underpin the size and scale of large cities and their 
significant contributions within national economies. Yet, oovercoming fragmented 
local jurisdictions to improve the governance and economic, social and 
environmental development of major metropolitan areas remains a challenge. The 
complex, and sometimes conflicting and contested inter-relationships at stake raise 
important questions about the role of the state in wrestling with entrepreneurial 
and managerialist governance imperatives. City and government actors are 
simultaneously engaging with financial actors, the financialisation of the built 
environment, the enduring and integral position of the state in infrastructure given 
its particular characteristics, the transformation of infrastructure from a public 
good into an asset class through the agency of private and state interests, and what 
relationships, if any, exist between ‘effective’ urban governance systems and 
improved economic performance. 
 
Contributing to theoretical debates about the apparent ‘ungovernability’ of global 
cities and city-regions, this paper presents analysis and findings from new research 
examining the financialisation and governance of transport infrastructure in the 
London global city-region. The continued rise in London’s population is placing 
significant demands upon existing infrastructure assets and systems and provoking 
debates about the extent and nature of growth in the UK’s capital, the 
development of and relationship between urban and sub-urban built environments, 
and the ability of national, sub-national and local actors to plan infrastructure 
renewal and investment both within London’s formal administrative boundary and 
wider city-region. Combining aspects of urban entrepreneurialism and 
managerialism amidst the challenges of governing a global city-region, the search 
for new infrastructure investment by state actors is leading to the revival of specific 
funding and financing mechanisms and practices. The mixing of existing and new 
funding and financing techniques as well as governance arrangements in distinct 
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and, at times, hybrid ways, is amplifying the novel challenges facing actors and 
institutions responsible for London’s governance.  
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1. Introduction  
 
To sustain any Mayor’s vision, London government needs more financial 
powers to invest in London’s infrastructure and support its growth. So this 
plan is not a lobbying, manifesto or detailed planning document. It is our 
first ever strategic attempt to state exactly what infrastructure London 
needs, roughly how much it will cost, and how we can do it in the best 
possible way. London’s needs are stark. In order for Londoners to get the 
homes, water, energy, schools, transport, digital connectivity and better 
quality of life they require and expect, our city must have continued 
investment (Boris Johnson, former Mayor of London, Foreword to the 
London Infrastructure Investment Plan 2050).  
 
Governing the funding and financing of infrastructure has become a central 
concern for states at national, metropolitan/city-regional and city scales in the 
global North and South. Huge and mounting pressures for infrastructure renewal 
and development are being generated by ageing and physical deterioration of assets 
and systems, increasing demands for more integrated, sophisticated and sustainable 
services, and a renewed emphasis upon the critical role of infrastructure in 
strengthening national economic competitiveness, productivity and modernisation 
(Mizell and Allain-Dupré 2013; OECD 2013, 2014; Arezki et al. 2016). Against a 
background of fiscal consolidation, budgetary pressures and political reluctance to 
sanction large increases in national state borrowing for new capital investment, 
governments in advanced economies face the predicament of how to pay for 
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infrastructure renewal and development and devise governance arrangementsthat 
can plan, deliver, harness and facilitate engagement with new and existing actors 
and novel, untried, uncertain and speculative financial arrangements and practices 
in accountable, productive and transparent ways. This study has examined whether 
and how such issues can be interpreted through the prism of what Storper (2014: 
116) defines as “ungovernable metropolitan regions”. The research explored 
whether large metropolitan areas or global city-regions produce challenges that are 
easier or more difficult to resolve in places where populations are rising and 
markets more buoyant, but where demands and pressures for continued and 
increased infrastructure investment are much more acute in attempts to manage 
the consequences of growth. As contemporary public policy discourse is focused 
upon encouraging the channelling of public and private infrastructure investment 
to support the continued growth of already relatively economically successful 
(particularly global) city-regions, new empirical investigations are needed to 
increase our knowledge and understanding and explain the processes and actors 
involved in governing, funding and financing their urban infrastructure.  
 
The London Infrastructure Investment Plan (LIIP) 2050 outlines a pipeline of £1.3 
trillion of infrastructure enhancements and renewals in London between 2016 and 
2050 (Mayor of London 2014). It sits alongside a commitment made by the UK 
government to invest £100 billion in UK infrastructure between 2015 and 2020 
(HM Treasury 2013). In LIIP’s foreword, the former Mayor of London, Boris 
Johnson, alludes to four inter-connected issues shaping the distinct form of 
financialisation and governance of infrastructure in London. First, London’s 
governance institutions are demanding greater decentralisation and fiscal autonomy 
to enable London to invest more ‘locally-generated’ revenues in infrastructure 
assets and systems (see also London Finance Commission 2013). Second, the plan 
represents the first attempt to map London’s infrastructure requirements over a 
longer-term period. Third, the LIIP identifies specific sectors where new 
 5 
 
investment is needed, and where funding and financing should be prioritised due 
to cost, value for money and wider economic, social and environmental outputs 
and outcomes. Fourth, in portraying the plan as a ‘critical moment’ for London, 
the former Mayor has made an emotive case for more infrastructure in London to 
enable the global city-region to further grow and to sustain its economic and fiscal 
contribution to the UK economy. 
 
In this paper, the argument is that the governance of infrastructure investment in 
London, a global city-region occupying a dominant position within a highly-
centralised state, is being continually transformed by a distinct set of international, 
national and local public and private institutional relationships shaped by the UK’s 
particular political-economy and neo-liberal variegation of capitalism (Peck and 
Theodore 2007). Financialisation – defined as the growing influence of capital 
markets, intermediaries and processes in economic, social and political life (Pike 
and Pollard 2010) – has been propelled by private actors widening and deepening 
their engagement with urban infrastructure, although this remains a socially and 
spatially differentiated, negotiated and uneven process (Strickland 2015). The role 
of the state, operating at different spatial levels, is being re-worked and in some 
circumstances reinforced in the context of infrastructure financialisation because of 
the large-scale, capital intensive and long-term character of infrastructure in the 
provision of essential services. Aspects of urban entrepreneurialism and 
managerialism are being combined and mixed by national and local state actors 
amidst the challenges of funding, financing and governing infrastructure in a global 
city-region. Although there is a pivotal and enduring role for the public sector at 
national, sub-national and local scales (O’Neill 2013; Strickland 2015; Ashton et al. 
2014), the resulting uneven geographies of infrastructure financialisation and 
governance require close conceptual and empirical scrutiny. This is particularly the 
case in the context of global cities and city-regions where the national state retains 
a direct economic, political and social tinterest, and international, national and local 
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public and private actors intersect in an attempt to assemble different modes of 
capital to invest into the urban built environment.  
 
As the funding and financing of urban infrastructure is transforming the 
governance of cities and city-regions (Torrance 2008), importance is attached to 
‘effective’ urban governance as a factor behind successful economic performance 
(OECD 2015). Such concerns are especially visible in large metropolitan or city-
region areas, where governance and questions of ‘(un)governability’ arise because 
functional economic geographies are continually remade in a dynamic manner and 
tend to transcend rather than align with formal administrative boundaries (Storper 
2014). At the same time, as the pervasiveness and pace of change in governing, 
funding and financing urban infrastructure has deepened and accelerated, theory 
has struggled to bring together and draw out the wider meanings and explanatory 
purchase of processes, including financialisation, decentralisation, state 
restructuring and austerity. Drawing upon new research from a case study of the 
London ‘global city-region’ and its transport infrastructure, this paper seeks to 
contribute to further conceptual understanding and explanation of the governance 
and financialisation of funding and financing mechanisms and practices within a 
fast-growing major metropolitan area seeking increasing levels of investment for 
infrastructure renewal and development. In so doing, the paper responds to 
Weber’s (2010) call for more empirically-grounded studies of the particular ways in 
which the funding and financing of urban infrastructure is reconfiguring urban 
spaces and institutional arrangements, including the governance and spatial 
planning of cities and city-regions. 
 
The paper starts in section 2 by reviewing the existing literature on global cities, 
city-regions, and the challenge of governing such places, which is giving rise to the 
notion of ‘ungovernability’. Here, we recognise that some places have been more 
successful economically despite being situated within complex and problematic 
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forms of urban governance. The paper then moves on in section 3 to examine 
some of the theoretical and conceptual arguments relating to the governing, 
funding and financing of urban infrastructure, with a particular focus on global 
cities and city-regions. In an introduction to the main case study research, the 
broader context of the London global city-region’s political economy in section 4 
analyses its recent economic boom and rising population, and its related 
infrastructure pressures. This sets for the scene, in section 5, for the examination 
of the governing, funding and financing of transport infrastructure in London, 
drawing upon analysis of major projects and Transport for London’s foray into 
property development as a mechanism for leveraging investment into transport 
schemes. In the concluding section 6, we outline the implications of continued 
concentration of national infrastructural resources in London for government 
efforts to address geographical disparities in economic and social conditions across 
the UK.  
 
 
2. Global cities, city-regions and ‘governability’  
 
A large body of literature has identified the rise of the ‘world city’ (Hall 1966,, 
Friedman and Wolff 1982), ‘global city’ (Sassen 1991) or ‘global city-region’ (Scott 
et al. 2002: 11) as urban populations grow and economic growthgrowth becomes 
increasingly urbanised and globally inter-connected (Harrison and Hoyler 2015; 
Scott 2002; 2008; Scott and Storper 2015). However, although cities and city-
regions are typically defined by their size and scale (Harding and Blokland 2014), 
urban areas are not uniformally growing in demographic and spatial terms, and 
‘urban shrinkage’ is a visible feature of local and regional development in North 
America and Europe (Pallagst et al. 2009; Pike et al. 2016).  
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During the last two decades, there has been growing interest in extending and 
deepening understanding of how the development and functional operation of 
internationally significant cities and city-regions, such as London, New York and 
Tokyo, is supported, planned and governed. ‘Global city’ status has seen a small 
group of elite cities and city-regions bestowed a privileged position within the 
global-urban hierarchy, distanced from other ‘ordinary cities’ (Beauregard 2003; 
Peck 2015). Mindful of the challenge of spatially defining growing metropolitan 
areas, Hall and Pain (2006: 3) introduced the concept of the “polycentric 
metropolis” as an entity de-coupled from national economies but situated within 
an accelerating globalisation process. Such ‘emergent mega-city-regions’, although 
physically separate from each other, were functionally inter-connected in terms of 
their economic structure and division of labour (McCann 2016). In western 
Europe, Hall and Pain (2006) identified eight global ‘city-regions’: South East 
England (London); the Randstad; Central Belgium; Rhine-Ruhr; the Rhine-Main 
Region; Northern Switzerland; the Paris Region; and Greater Dublin. Hall and 
Pain also called for further research to examine the relationships, differences and 
similarities between ‘global’ or ‘mega-city-regions’, alongside further analysis of the 
domestic spatial contexts in which these urban and regional entities were located in 
an attempt to strengthen knowledge and understanding of the relationships 
between global cities and city-regions and uneven development within national 
economies.  
 
In the 1970s, scholars began to link particular forms of urban development with 
major socio-economic transformations within the global economy (Castells, 1977; 
Harvey, 1973), demonstrating how over-accumulation and surplus capital ‘injected’ 
into urban spaces rendered cities and city-regions contested sites of social, 
economic and political relationships. Friedman (1986) developed an analytical 
framework for defining the global city based on a number of distinct political, 
social and economic features: high levels of integration within the world economy; 
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key nodes in the international flow of finance, people and ideas; hosts of global 
production and employment functions; focal destinations for domestic and 
international migrants; locations where the contradictions of capitalism are most 
evident and class and spatial polarisation most apparent; key sites for the 
concentration and accumulation of global capital; and, places where the fiscal 
capacities of national and local states often struggle to prevent major social costs 
from materialising.  
 
Sassen (2001) identified New York, London and Tokyo as pivotal locations for a 
global pattern of major business service networks that provided a skeletal 
framework for contemporary globalisation (Taylor 2012; Scott and Storper 2015). 
Globalised capital cities and wider city-regions occupied privileged positions within 
the international urban hierarchy because they offered close proximity to political,  
administrative, business and financial decision-makers, and were able to attract and 
retain human capital from a large and internationalised pool of highly-skilled 
labour (Crouch and Le Gales 2012). Alongside the rapid growth of the higher 
echelons of the global city and city-region economy, the accompanying rise of low-
paid, insecure and precarious forms of employment extended the geographical 
reach of the global city and city-region and helped to exacerbate and intensify 
social and spatial inequalities. Rising property values and high living costs in dense 
urban cores contributed towards the increasing dispersal of lower-paid workers 
from city centre residential locations, extending commuting distances and 
rendering poorer and low-skilled workers more reliant upon effective and cost-
efficient public transport systems (Wills et al. 2010). 
 
Whilst urbanisation processes have accelerated and consolidated under 
globalisation (Brenner and Keil 2006), complex spatial mismatches have intensified 
within global cities and city-regions. Land use policies and strategies are contested 
between urban cores and peripheries, often requiring careful negotiation and 
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effective regulation by strategic planning authorities and governance institutions 
that embrace public and private actors operating across and within broad 
geographical areas (Scott 2001; Scott and Storper 2015). The process is more 
profound and challenging at the geographical scale of the city-region, which often 
transcends formal administrative and governance boundaries constructed at the 
city-scale. Significantly, the state retains a pivotal role in land-use planning as the 
market alone cannot plan, resource and steer the growth or alleviate the trajectories 
of city-regions and lead the investment and renewal of the infrastructures that are 
critical to building and maintaining prosperous urban economies (Storper 2014; 
Tewdwr-Jones 2012).  
 
In identifying and framing the concept of ‘ungovernability’, Storper (2014) has 
explained how the governance of large metropolitan areas is shaped by a series of 
strong economic interdependencies, and that fragmented governance is both an 
illustration and outcome of how city-regions function as complex economic, social 
and spatial entities. Whilst institutions are key ingredients in shaping urban success 
or failure (Storper 1995; OECD 2012; OECD 2015), large cities and city-regions:  
 
exhibit an extremely high level of economic, social, environmental, 
infrastructural and ‘public order’ interdependence, but for which there is 
rarely an overarching political authority (such as a sovereign, unified regional 
government). In this sense, metropolitan governance is the governance 
problem par excellence (Storper 2014: 116).  
 
As large cities and city-regions grow, attempts are made to better-coordinate the 
activities of local government units within and between functional economic or 
travel-to-work areas, a challenge that increases over time and space. In response, it 
is typical for new institutions or agencies to be created, which overlay in-situ 
arrangements but can also exacerbate existing disjointed modes of governance, 
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thus rendering places even more ungovernable (Storper 2014). The ungovernability 
‘problem’ is more acute for global cities and city-regions in the context of 
infrastructure. In this realm, actors wrestle with both entrepreneurial and 
managerial forms of urbanism, stimulating growth through speculative actions, but 
equally having to engage in providing the collective provision of infrastructure 
through more interventionist and managerialist means in an effort to assemble and 
sustain capital investment and renewal. 
 
National and local state actors continually have to adjust governance arrangements 
in an attempt to establish institutional arrangements capable of building and 
maintaining effective city-region-wide governance and leadership (Nelles 2013). As 
a consequence, the spatial form and organisation of global cities and city-regions is 
often in flux. This reflects the evolution of economy, polity and society, the 
demands for better quality of life and improved infrastructure and services from 
residents and workforces, and the continued search for means of mitigating the 
negative economic, social and environmental consequences of urbanisation 
(Ahrend et al. 2014). These ongoing processes strengthen the argument for 
defining large metropolitan geographies as chaotic and even ‘uncontrollable’ places  
(Lefèbvre 1970), given the depth, range and scale of market dynamics, state 
regulatory regimes and public, private and civic society actors interacting with and 
within global cities and city-regions at any one time (Storper 1997; Scott 1998). 
There is often multiple overlapping and disparate local governments, each 
responsible for different functions (Wood 1961), and each having to respond to 
the various interests and preferences of local constituencies (Storper 2014). Under 
such circumstances, the policy challenge confronting state actors is twofold. First is 
to reach consensus between different units of government – from national, 
regional, city-region to local – as each has a stake in addressing common problems 
(Kantor et. al. 2012). Second, large metropolitan areas – and the units of 
government within them – have to adapt and evolve when particular roles and 
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responsibilities come under pressure as the city and city-region expands or 
contracts spatially, socially and economically. Reform can be problematic 
particularly in relation to transport as spatial parameters are revised to manage the 
consequences of growth: 
 
A larger urban area will, for example, generate a natural need for a more 
extensive transport system. But the pre-existing boundaries for transit 
operators and financing more services tend to trap the principals behind 
agents whose boundaries are no longer the right ones to serve new needs as 
they arise (Storper 2014: 120). 
 
So-called global ‘alpha cities’ have been at the vanguard of new and emergent 
theories and policies in urban studies, and have become the pre-eminent normative 
model for emulation across the urban spectrum (Peck 2014). Global city and city-
region institutions and actors have articulated a repertoire of growth, governance, 
place-promotion, civic boosterism, devolution, and competition (Beauregard 2003; 
Crouch 2011). Intensified urban competition has challenged cities and city-regions 
to grow larger and faster, which in turn produces new stresses and increases 
demand for further investment in infrastructure and other services. In an 
increasingly competitive environment, national governments, which, at one time, 
could ‘bankroll’ domestic firms, are now instead steering public investment 
towards global cities and city-regions (particularly capital cities) that are regarded as 
‘national champions’ (Crouch and Le Gales 2012). In this contex, ‘economic 
patriotism’ has taken a different and more urban turn (Clift and Woll 2012). 
Crouch and Le Gales (2012) suggest that more resources for national champion 
global cities and city-regions has profound implications for addressing uneven 
development as national governments risk provoking intense opposition in other 
regions nationally, and fracturing pre-existing redistributive territorial policies 
designed to address spatial imbalances (Martin 2015; Martin et al. 2015). Mindful of 
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the impact of these relationships, Hall and Pain (2006) suggest that research on 
global cities and city-regions should embrace relational perspectives to help unpack 
and strengthen existing knowledge and understanding about the nature of the 
connections between large metropolitan areas and global city-regions and other 
cities and regions within national political economies. A call to which this paper 
responds directly.  
 
As economic competition increases and ‘market-making’ and supply-side policies 
become expansionist areas for state activities (Levy 2006), the role of the state, 
especially in austere times, has evolved. Traditional urban managerialist emphasis 
upon redistributive spatial policies seeking to direct growth to lagging places in an 
effort to reduce spatial disparities has been superseded by more urban 
entrepreneurialist approaches focused on attracting private investment and 
ensuring the performance of the most successful cities and city-regions contributes 
towards strengthening national competitiveness irrespective of its impact upon 
spatial disparities (Harvey 1989; Crouch and Le Gales 2012). The UK has more 
pronounced and persistent spatial imbalances than most other advanced 
economies (Martin et al. 2015). Successive national governments have made public 
pronouncements about achieving sectoral and spatial ‘rebalancing’ while 
simultaneously looking to protect and enhance the ‘gains’ said to accure nationally 
from the increasing spatial agglomeration of economic activity in London (Martin 
2015). Across the developed world, national governments are coming under 
increasing pressure to devolve more responsibilities and resources to cities and 
city-regions (Katz and Bradley 2014; 2013; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2003). 
Consequently, new and emergent ‘spatial imaginaries’ of economic governance at 
different geographical scales are being constructed (Pike and Tomaney 2009). 
 
The transition in thinking and diagnosis of the urban condition has been informed 
by New Economic Geography (NEG) and New Urban Economics (NUE) 
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approaches. Each of which have gained firm footholds in international (e.g. World 
Bank 2009) and national government and policy-making and academic circles, 
including the UK (BIS/DCLG 2010). Although derived from different conceptual 
roots, when considering the origins and consequences of regional and urban 
growth and economic disparities, NEG and NUE share similar diagnosis and 
responses. Particular attention is given to the scale, density and concentration of 
economic activities in urban areas capable of creating the thick labour markets, 
specialised goods and services suppliers and knowledge spill-overs that underpin 
the external economies of agglomeration and growth (Cheshire et al. 2014). Both 
NEG and NUE approaches argue that traditional policy interventions can lead to 
public resources being dissipated and spread too thinly, undermining overall 
national economic performance (Martin 2015). Proponents of NUE, which has 
been influential in shaping UK urban policy since 2010, suggest that public 
investment should focus on strengthening the most productive and successful 
cities to increase total national growth (see Martin 2015 for a review of these 
models and Haughton et al. 2014 for a critique). In theoretical terms, spatial 
agglomeration is a logical market outcome of increasing returns and mobility 
factors that increase growth up until congestion costs and other negative 
externalities start to produce diseconomies of agglomeration (Martin 2012).  
 
The influence of the state in determining the spatial distribution of economic 
activity across space is only belatedly being recognised in both NEG and NUE. 
Acknowledged are regulation and growth-enabling state-led investments in the 
form of collective public goods, especially infrastructure (Krugman 2015; OECD 
2016). Public investment is territorially uneven, and can either reduce or reinforce 
geographical imbalances (Harding et al. 2015). Large urban areas often require 
major capital investments in order to defer diseconomies of agglomeration, which 
can undermine economic productivity and growth (Martin 2008). However, the 
costs of maintaining and upgrading transport and other infrastructure assets and 
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systems in dense metropolitan areas is becoming increasingly expensive, in part due 
to rising land values (HM Treasury 2010). The state may choose to make large-
scale transport investments in a particular city or city-region in an effort to reduce 
congestion. But the risk is that further investment encourages greater spatial 
concentration of activity, which then creates more pressure on infrastructure, 
increases environmental degradation, which then requires additional investment to 
alleviate. This results in a virtuous or vicious circle in which the question is posed 
as to whether “transport investment promotes economic growth or more growth 
encourages more demand for transport, and thus further investment?” (Bannister 
and Berechman 2001: 214).1  
 
This section has reviewed the literature on the rise of the ‘global city and city-
region’ and illustrated the challenges in how such places are governed, often across 
large geographies encompassing multiple and fragmented local units of 
government. Such situations have raised the critical questions of concern here 
about the ‘governability’ of the global city and city-region. These issues have been 
amplified through the dominance and tensions arising from agglomeration 
economics, whereby public policy and public and private investment is increasingly 
targeted at large, economically-successful cities and city-regions in order to sustain 
and manage growth and development but which equally results in further 
investment being required to address the negative consequences of growth. The 
next section reviews how public and private actors work individually and 
collectively to identify and assemble investment in urban infrastructure when 
confronted with rising costs, fragmented governance, uneven spatial planning 
arrangements and in the context of private finance seeking new assets, including 
infrastructure, in which to invest capital. The consequence of these developments 
                                                          
1 The INRIX Traffic Scorecard for 2015 says ‘strong economic growth and record population levels’ made London 
the first city to exceed 100 annually wasted hours per driver in jams, and become the most congested city out of 100 
cities surveyed worldwide. In 2014, London became the most congested city in Europe. Details at: 
http://inrix.com/press/scorecard-uk/  
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for the governance of cities and city-regions, particularly those of a global scale, are 
explored.    
 
3. Governing, funding and financing urban infrastructures  
 
Infrastructure underpins and connects sites for fundamental human and social 
activities in the home, and places to learn, work and play in cities and city-regions 
across the world. Infrastructure is geographically concentrated in urban areas as 
more people globally are living in urban environments (UN-Habitat 2016). 
Infrastructure has been an integral and recurrent part of city and city-region 
economy, society and polity historically. Earlier episodes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation in western Europe and North America in the 19th century were 
predicated upon and supported by large scale and sustained infrastructure 
investment (Pollard 1981). The economic, social, political and cultural histories of 
cities and city-regions are marked by infrastructural moments and transformations. 
Who pays for and who runs urban infrastructure have endured as central questions 
of funding, financing and governing throughout such historical episodes, evolving 
broadly from piecemeal private initiatives and capital to national and municipal 
state provision and taxes, user charges and borrowing (Jacobson and Tarr, 1994). 
 
Since the 1990s, infrastructure has returned to prominence in contemporary 
urbanism. An international narrative supportive of infrastructure, especially in 
cities and city-regions, is evident. A number of connecting currents have 
formented a resurgence of attention and interest in a “global infrastructure turn” 
(Dodson 2017: 87). A globalising and digitalising economy and society with rising 
income levels, notwithstanding growing social and spatial inequalities within 
countries, have fuelled demand for infrastructure systems and services as “an 
essential part of everyday life that we want to be efficient and well maintained” 
(Rowark 2014: 1). Infrastructure is interpreted by public and private actors as being 
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central to addressing the global challenges of climate change, demographic shifts, 
social and spatial inequalities, and technological transformations in resilient and 
sustainable ways (UN-Habitat 2016). In this so-called but problematic “urban age” 
(Brenner and Schmid 2013: 731), cities and city-regions have become the main 
focus for the spatial concentrations of infrastructure provision.  
 
Amidst the articulations by public, private and civic actors of the increasing 
importance of urban infrastructure in economic, social, environmental and 
technological terms, the contemporary urban infrastructure realm appears beset by 
a sense of anxiety, even in some contexts, such as the US, an “infrastructure crisis” 
(Kettl 2010: 1). Symptoms appear manifold and widespread in cities and city-
regions across the world: congestion and gridlock; ageing and poor quality systems 
and services; crowded and dilapidated public transportation systems; breakdowns 
and failures; pollution and poor air quality; and, socially and spatially uneven access 
and use (Graham 2010, Woetzel et al. 2016). Further layers of issues include the 
unplanned withdrawal from infrastructure contracts by private providers leaving 
national and municipal governments to take on responsibilities. Public contestation 
and social protest have also emerged against the perceived private and public 
failures of collective urban infrastructure provision (Olivera and Lewis 2004). The 
underlying causes of such manifestations of ‘crisis’ appear to lie in the collision of 
numerous inter-connected phenomena: under-investment; national and local state 
restructuring and austerity; public anger at infrastructure shortcomings amidst 
rising expectations; and the growing ambitions and participation of financial actors 
in urban infrastructure. 
 
With this renewed international academic interest and scrutiny, public policy 
deliberation and political debate, the fundamental questions of how to pay for and 
how to manage urban infrastructure remain thorny, pressing and difficult to 
resolve (O’Neill 2017). Paying for, organising the capital investment, operating, 
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managing and governing city and city-region infrastructures are acute, large-scale 
and long-term matters. Infrastructure, especially in cities, has become emblematic 
of the post-Global Financial Crisis 21st century zeitgeist; a compelling narrative and 
necessary touchstone of urban, regional and national development aspirations, 
hopes and prospects for public and private actors across the world. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014: 75) has asked whether it is “time for an 
infrastructure push” to address “needs” and “bottlenecks” to raise output in 
advanced and emerging countries in response to economic and demand weakness 
because “investment efficiency is high”, borrowing costs relatively low, and debt-
to-GDP ratios considered manageable. The OECD (2015: 5) considers the need 
for “infrastructure investment…to be substantially increased in most developing 
and emerging economies to meet social needs and support more rapid economic 
growth”. For the private sector, infrastructure has emerged as “an attractive 
investment opportunity in itself” (OECD 2015: 5) and “asset class” (Inderst 2010: 
70), given infrastructure’s particular economic characteristics as critical, long-term 
and sometimes monopolistic assets with predictable revenue streams over a 
sustained period. As a result, infrastructure has become increasingly enrolled in 
financialisation processes (Allen and Pryke 2013).  
 
The state still plays a major role in infrastructure at different spatial scales because 
of infrastructure’s large capital requirements and strong association with statutory 
planning, property and land ownership issues that require governance, regulation, 
negotiation and resolution (O’Neill 2013). The state retains an integral and 
enduring role in collective urban infrastructure provision because of its interests in 
capital accumulation, managing externalities and other market failures, and the 
long-term time horizon and monopoly and competition issues arising from 
infrastructure that call “for some combination of finance capital and state 
engagements” (Harvey 2012: 12). In addition, some major urban infrastructure 
schemes incur substantial risks and costs during construction phases that only 
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governments are either able or willing to bear and underwrite. This is increasingly 
evident in global cities and city-regions where the costs of building new 
infrastructure are high and increasing (HM Treasury 2010; Rosenthal 2017).  
 
Urban development, including infrastructure renewal, acts as a mechanism for 
addressing the problem of surplus capital (Harvey 2012.U). Urbanisation and its 
infrastructures facilitate the expansion of capital accumulation amidst class 
struggle: “in order for capital to circulate freely in space and time, physical 
infrastructures and built environments must be created that are fixed in space” 
(Harvey 2015 :75). Investment in physical infrastructure is necessary to enable 
capital accumulation in certain times and spaces but later that same infrastructure 
becomes the barrier to further accumulation (Harvey 1982). Competition between 
capitalists generates ‘over-accumulation’ in the primary circuit of capital – the 
production or manufacturing sector – causing falling prices, a crisis of profitability, 
and rising unemployment. ‘Capital switching’ seeks to overcome this constraint, 
moving investment into the secondary circuit of capital – the “built environment 
for production” including economic infrastructure, factories and offices and the 
“built environment for consumption” such as the social infrastructure of 
education, housing and retail – and committing further long-term investment to 
immobile assets in an only ever temporary ‘spatial fix’ to support further 
accumulation (Harvey 1978: 106). The long-term life-cycles of physical investments 
force capital continually to reinvent new ‘capital switching’ techniques to connect 
private (and private-public) money with the urban built environment (Savanna and 
Albers, 2015; Aalbers 2012; Christophers 2011; Harvey 1985, 1989a, Weber 2015).  
 
This integral relationship between capital and urbanisation has sparked the search 
for ‘innovative’ mechanisms to increase the value of assets, using new and often 
riskier and speculative financial practices drawing together existing and new 
institutions and actors with differing public and financial interests in urban 
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development (Fainstein 2001). The transformation of infrastructure from a public 
good into an asset class is said to have accelerated under the current “special” 
episode of “global financialisation” (Harvey 2015: 177) characterised by 
“exponential growth” (2015: 100) of its sectoral and spatial reach, “phenomenal 
acceleration” (2015: 178) in the speed of capital circulation and turnover, 
emergence of novel institutional actors, instruments and practices, and the overall 
enhanced “pressure asserted by finance” (2015: 178).  
 
The financialisation of urban infrastructure is reconfiguring urban spaces and 
institutional and governance arrangements (Weber 2010). This paper focuses on 
transport because it is the infrastructure domain where the ungovernability of 
global cities and city-regions is increasingly framed, negotiated, tested and 
unresolved. As the nature and pace of change in governing, funding and financing 
urban infrastructure has deepened and accelerated, theory has struggled to identify 
and illustrate the wider meanings and explanatory purchase of processes, including 
financialisation, decentralisation, state restructuring and austerity. 
 
New spaces of governance facilitate the relationship between financialised 
capitalism and the urban landscape that materialise as interactions between actors 
in globalised financial institutions and the local state and its networks seeking to 
attract and channel international capital to invest in specific urban development 
projects. Crucially, Harvey (2010: 48) identifies the existence of a “state-financial 
nexus” in which state and private finance actors work together – particularly in the 
urban space – to facilitate capital flows that have a direct impact upon the nature 
of the urban environment and its governance. The state is often an active agent in 
seeking to attract private investment to increase property and/or tax yields (Harvey 
2010), and is not passive or at the whim of private sector actors (Valler 1996). 
Despite fiscal retrenchment and the erosion of urban-governmental capacities 
(Peck 2014), local states can act as either complicit and/or resistant agents in wider 
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structures and processes of urbanisation and financialisation. Financial risk is 
geographical in nature (Lee et al. 2009), and the executive and political capacities 
and competencies of local governments are institutionally and geographically 
variegated (Ashton et al. 2014). Weber (2010) calls for research to examine 
financialisation from the perspective of the local state and to adopt a more “agent-
centred approach” (Weber 2015: 7) in order to help understand how market 
structures are produced and reproduced and institutional intermediaries are created 
and operate.  
 
The role of the local state in underpinning the financialisation of urban 
infrastructure reflects a shifting landscape and mixing between urban 
managerialism and urban entrepreneurialism. Local government actors have been 
encouraged to adopt entrepreneurial approaches to urban economic development 
and focus on growth coalitions and heightened inter-urban competition (Harvey 
1989). The local state is increasingly required de facto to align more closely with 
business and adopt private enterprise commercial strategies and behaviours 
(Hackworth 2007). Harvey (1989: 4) identifies the entrepreneurial approaches of 
different urban actors, encompassing public, private and civic spheres, individually 
and collectively engaged in devising new and ‘innovative’ approaches to achieve 
growth because “urban governments had to be much more innovative, willing to 
explore all kinds of avenues through which to alleviate their distressed condition 
and thereby secure a better future for their populations”. In the current episode of 
financialisation and austerity in advanced economies, new forms of urban 
entrepreneurial policy transactions and linkages, with speculative traits and 
uncertain outputs, are creating profound spatial consequences for cities and city-
regions searching for new funding and financing for development and growth. 
Local government institutions are being drawn into new relationships with 
financial actors and financialised instruments. However, such patterns are not 
uniform. In highly-centralised states such as the UK, conservative and risk-averse 
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national administrative cultures and managerialist institutions continue to constrain 
and limit forms of urban infrastructure financialisation and entrepreneurial 
governance at city, city-region and local scales (O’Brien and Pike 2018).  
 
Understanding the contemporary patterns and processes of state and market 
involvement in urban development and governance following the global financial 
crisis requires further empirical analysis and interpretation of how the crisis and its 
aftermath have been re-shaping the landscape of urban development (including 
infrastructure renewal), and in paving the way for new and experimental forms of 
urban governance (see for example Peck et al. 2013, Oosterlynck and Gonzalez 
2013). The argument in this paper is that amidst the acute problems of governing, 
funding and financing urban infrastructure, amidst the ‘ungovernability’ of global 
cities and city-regions, new configurations of entrepreneurial and managerialist 
urbanism are being constructed, enacted and experimented with. Moving on from 
any binary understanding and explanation of transitions between discrete eras in 
urban governance, the conceptualisation here interprets a mixing, overlapping and 
connecting of entrepreneurialism and managerialism. National and local states and 
financial actors in global cities and city-regions are wrestling with the difficult, even 
intractable, urban infrastructure conundrum; innovating new and speculative 
practices such as ‘value capture’ as well as mobilising existing techniques, including 
state grants and guarantees. Some cities and city-regions are circumventing private 
ownership to manage infrastructure (e.g. water and energy) directly through re-
municipalisation (Cumbers 2012). Elsewhere, governments are encouraging private 
interests to purchase or lease publicly-owned assets (e.g. infrastructure asset 
‘recycling’ in Australia) in order to generate capital receipts to re-invest in 
infrastructure. Even where the state does not have direct ownership, it remains an 
inseparable partner in infrastructure assets that are in private hands (such as 
utilities) through regulatory frameworks and property relationships, resulting in a 
more complex, uncertain and nuanced inter-connection between public and private 
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sectors in infrastructure functions, purposes, funding, financing and governance 
(O’Neill 2009). 
 
This paper seeks to make a contribution towards research examining the precise 
forms that urban entrepreneurialism and managerialism take within specific 
temporal and geographical contexts (Wood 1998). Significantly, Harvey qualified 
his notion of an apparent transformation from urban managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism as contradictory, partial and uneven. Reflections in the 
contemporary period concur and have interpreted it as “an historical process very 
much in motion, a story of contradictory transformation not a teleological homily” 
(Peck 2014a: 396). Rather than providing a “universal template” or “single concrete 
composite” (Peck 2014a: 396), managerialist and entrepreneurial urban governance 
are better understood as rationales, strategies, practices and techniques with 
particular characteristics and contradictions that unfold in spatially and temporally 
uneven ways across and between geographical levels. Brenner’s (2004) distinction 
between variants of entrepreneurial governance in the 1970s and those in the 
1980s and 1990s suggests that urban entrepreneurial systems are continually and 
contingently re-made and re-configured, especially during periods of crisis (Leitner 
and Sheppard 1998; Peck and Tickell 1994).  
 
In global cities and city-regions, where governance is often more fragmented and 
infrastructure investment costs higher, this means that a large number of public 
and private actors are required to work together to identify and adopt a variety of 
financial and regulatory mechanisms – some managerialist, some entrepreneurial, 
others hybrid – to plan, fund, finance and implement urban development projects, 
including critical infrastructure. The ways in which these processes are governed 
vary, and require clear theorisation and close empirical scrutiny of how and why 
actors formulate infrastructure funding and financing mechanisms and practices in 
particular urban settings. This paper also responds to Le Gales’ (2016: 156) call for 
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empirical research to inform theoretical and conceptual knowledge and 
understanding about the particular processes, actors and institutions shaping 
particular forms of urbanisation and urban change, as “urban worlds and the 
urbanization processes of cities do not change all the time, in all ways”. It also 
chimes with scholars who are sceptical of the argument that urban governance and 
development has witnessed a “massive withdrawal of the state” (Storper 2016: 
241). The proposition is that the concept of ‘ungovernability’, especially in global 
cities and global city-regions, is both a response to and impact of the melding of 
urban entrepreneurialism and managerialism and pragmatic reflection of the 
broader economic, social, political and environmental challenges public and private 
actors face in supporting urban development and renewal. 
 
In global city-regions, the search for new funding and financing models for urban 
infrastructure is drawing together international, national and local actors – from 
across different public and private sectors – meaning that the governance of 
infrastructure funding and financing is taking on greater significance. O’Neill 
(2016) suggests that institutional ensembles and operations shape the particular 
relationships between infrastructure investors and clients (including governments), 
and political valuations determine the specific infrastructure projects that receive 
support and investment that are based upon targeted, bespoke regulatory and 
organisational arrangements and tailored financial packaging.  
 
The ability of capital to create and monetise new asset classes is one of the most 
pervasive processes in a ingfinancialising economy (Leyshon and Thrift 2007). 
Questions have arisen about the current “narratives of financialization…as scripts 
of linear, uninterrupted, ineluctable development” (Christophers 2015: 194). In 
answering calls for greater geographical appreciation of how financialisation plays 
out across space and time (French et al. 2011), this paper aims to strengthen 
understanding of the uneven geographies of public and private actor engagements 
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in infrastructure investment, and the ways in which financial interests, instruments 
and practices are unfolding between and/or within different countries, regions and 
cities. Drawing upon a conceptual framework that identifies the general 
characteristics of financialised infrastructure investment practices (Table 1), the 
analysis seeks to explain how such new and/or emergent approaches are being 
introduced and are being adapted and/or replacing or mixing with longstanding 
strategies and techniques. Traditional and emergent approaches in governing urban 
infrastructure funding and financing are evident that reflect transitions from the 
“modern infrastructural ideal” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 43) associated with 
urban managerialist governance towards those more reflective of urban 
entrepreneurialism (Table 2). Rather than proposing a binary transition model, this 
analytical framework seeks to identify and capture the characteristics of new, 
reworked existing, emergent and hybrid approaches and practices to inform the 
empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of financialised infrastructure investment practices 
Source: Adapted from Strickland (2015) 
 
 
 
 
1. The growing involvement of financial actors or intermediaries. 
2. An increasing exposure of cities to – or dependence on – financial markets. 
3. The increasing use of financial technologies, such as securitisation. 
4. A reliance on a framework of financial calculation to predict, model and speculate against 
the future. 
5. A transformation in the purpose, function, values and objectives of government, which are 
being brought in line with those of financial actors and institutions. 
6. An increase in public sector indebtedness and risk taking. 
7. The transformation of infrastructure from a physical and productive component of the 
urban environment into a financial asset defined by risk and return. 
8. The increasing control over infrastructure by yield-seeking surplus capital. 
9. The transformation of infrastructure into a tool for growth and tax base expansion. 
10. The highly geographically uneven ability to engage successfully – if at all – in funding or 
financing infrastructure. 
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Dimension Traditional approaches Emergent approaches 
Rationale(s) Economic efficiency (and 
social equity) 
Market failure 
Unlocking economic potential 
(e.g. GVA, employment)  
Expanding future revenue 
streams and/or tax base 
Releasing uplift in land values 
Market failure  
Focus Individual infrastructure 
items (e.g. roads, bridges, rail 
lines) 
Infrastructure systems and 
interdependencies (e.g. 
connectivity, 
telecommunications, district 
heating) 
Timescale Short(er) 5-10 years Long(er) to 25-30 years 
Geography Local authority administrative 
area 
‘Functional Economic 
Area’/‘Travel to Work Area’, 
city-region, multiple local 
authority areas 
Scale Small, targeted Large, encompassing 
Lead Public sector Public and/or private sectors 
Organisation Projects Programmes 
Funding Grant-based (e.g. from taxes, 
fees and levies) 
Investment-led (e.g. from 
existing assets and revenue 
streams, grant, borrowing) 
Financing Established and tried and 
tested instruments and 
practices (e.g. bonds, 
borrowing) 
Innovative, new and adapted 
instruments and practices 
(e.g. value capture, asset 
 27 
 
leverage and leasing, 
revolving funds) 
Process Formula-driven allocation, 
(re)distributive, closed 
Negotiated, competition-
based, open 
Governance Centralised 
Top-down 
National government and 
single local authority-based 
(De)centralised 
Bottom-up and top-down 
National government and 
multiple local authority-based 
(e.g. Combined Authorities, 
Joint Committees) 
Management and delivery Single local authority-based, 
arms-length agencies and 
bodies 
Multiple local authority-
based, joint ventures and new 
vehicles 
Table 2: Transitions in approaches to governing infrastructure funding and financing at 
the city/city-region scale 
Source: Authors’ research 
 
 
 
 
In examining the financialisation of urban infrastructure, the aim is to contribute to 
the recent body of literature on the governance of the funding and financing of 
urban infrastructure and its implications for cities and city-regions (see, for 
example, Ashton et al. 2014, Farmer 2014, Guironnet and Halbert 2014, Halbert 
and Attuyer 2016, O’Neill 2013, Peck and Whiteside 2016, Strickland 2015, Weber 
2010). The empirical focus is a case study of the funding, financing and governance 
of transport infrastructure in the London global city-region. Infrastructure is the 
prism through which financialisation and governance collide. Transport, 
particularly in the London global city-region, is one of the most urgent, capital 
intensive, long-term and complex areas in geographical, governance, planning and 
funding and financing terms. Although infrastructure is a domain where there is a 
major application of financial instruments, we draw a distinction between ‘funding’ 
and ‘financing’ (Table 3) and recognise the limits to how the concept of 
financialisation is applied in ‘financial studies’ (Christophers 2015). Funding relates 
the income sources needed to meet the costs of infrastructure construction and 
operation over time (Maxwell-Jackson 2013). Financing is the arrangement that 
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enables the up-front costs of a project to be met initially and repaid over its life 
cycle, and involves the costs of the services of putting together the finance 
arrangement and the actual cost of capital itself (O’Neill 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding 
 
Public sector (tax) revenue 
sources 
Joint public and private 
revenue sources 
 
Private sector (market) 
revenue sources 
Taxes and assessments 
Availability and other public 
sector payments 
Grants 
Land and property sales  
Other contributions (e.g. tax 
credits) 
Joint development and 
commercial activity (e.g. asset 
backed vehicles) 
Regulated asset based 
Project-generated revenues 
(e.g. charges, tolls, 
user/consumer fees) 
Real estate developer 
contributions 
Other commercial revenues 
(e.g. land sales, provision of 
other services to users, 
sponsorship) 
Crowdfunding 
Financing 
 
Public Joint public and private 
 
Private 
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Pay-as-you-go: taxes, fees and 
grants 
Local/public authority 
reserves 
Government gilts 
National government loans 
(e.g. UK Public Works Loan 
Board) 
Supranational body loans and 
other instruments (e.g. 
European Investment Bank 
JESSICA, Project Bonds) 
Equity 
Public sector pension funds 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign guarantees 
Public private partnerships 
Pay-as-you-go: project 
generated and other 
commercial revenues 
Banks (e.g. debt finance, 
loans) 
Pension and insurance funds 
(e.g. debt finance, loans) 
Capital markets (e.g. 
municipal and special 
purpose vehicle bonds) 
Project finance 
Secondary markets (e.g. 
infrastructure funds) 
Table 3: Infrastructure funding and financing 
Source: Adapted from Strickland (2015) 
 
The London case study sheds light on the actors and processes shaping the 
planning, governing, funding and financing of transport infrastructure in the urban 
built environment and demonstrates how different spatial and temporal-specific 
conditions and institutions shape the financialisation and governance of 
infrastructure in a global city-region. London was chosen due to its principal role 
in the international urban hierarchy, and central and historic position within the 
UK political economy. London is examined from the city-region scale, and 
consideration is given to the question of governance within and across a 
meaningful labour market geography that links London to the wider south east of 
England (Syrett 2006). Although not a mega city-region in population terms, 
London is a pre-eminent global city-region, from economic, social, political and 
cultural perspectives, and it is wrestling with the conundrum of how to manage 
growth and plan and govern strategically infrastructure within and across both 
formal and fragmented administrative geographies (Hall and Pain 2006). As urban 
infrastructure fixes for global cities and city-regions risk undermining national 
government efforts to reduce spatial disparities through sectoral and spatial 
‘rebalancing’, local states are having to rediscover and adapt the statecraft of 
municipal entrepreneurialism and managerialism for urban infrastructure provision 
and renewal in austerity. Transport infrastructure has been investigated as a priority 
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issue because it is the infrastructure sector where substantial public and/or private 
investments are being made and planned, new and adapted funding and financing 
models are being experimented with, existing strategic planning institutions and 
geographies are coming under stress, and new global city and city-region 
governance arrangements are being tried and developed.  
 
The research methodology, design and methods for the case study were based on: 
i) 20 semi-structured in-depth interviews with lead actors (e.g. elected members 
and officers in London and the south east of England, officials from central 
government, Greater London Authority (GLA), Transport for London (TfL), 
London Boroughs, London First and planning consultancies) undertaken between 
September 2015 and January 2016; and ii) a detailed review of secondary sources 
(e.g. documentation from the GLA, TfL, London Councils, central government, 
infrastructure investors and think-tanks). The political economy of the London 
global city-region is where the empirical narrative and analysis begins.    
 
 
4. The political economy of the London global city-region  
 
Combining aspects of urban entrepreneurialism and managerialism in response to 
the challenges of global city and city-region ungovernability under austerity, the 
spatial and temporal urban infrastructure fixes constructed by international, 
national and local actors are attempting to address some of the constraints on 
growth in the London global city-region given its significance to the UK economy 
and international status within the global urban hierarchy. But the resulting scale 
and cost burden bearing down on the national state and markedly uneven 
generation and distribution of public and private resources risks undermining the 
UK government’s national state project of ‘rebalancing’ and ‘spreading prosperity’ 
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as other cities and city-regions face intense financial constraints upon their urban 
infrastructure needs under austerity.  
 
Although recent accounts suggest a ‘decoupling’ of the London global city-region 
economy from the rest of the UK (McCann 2016), London remains integral to UK 
political-economic prosperity as the main engine of national growth and tax 
revenue generation. Funding, financing and governing urban infrastructure in 
London is an acute national and local concern given the city-region’s size and 
political-economic weight, growing demands for new infrastructure development 
and renewal, claims for further fiscal devolution, including tax revenue retention 
and borrowing powers, and fragmented local and sub-national governance that has 
stoked up problems of ‘ungovernability’ and long-term strategic planning and 
infrastructure provision. These issues are reinforcing a set of distinct challenges 
concerning the enduring nature of uneven development and spatial disparities in 
the UK, and London’s particular dominant role within the national political 
economy. This requires close exploration of the manner and evolution in which 
London has been governed both historically and spatially, and its urban 
infrastructure planned, funded and financed. 
 
4.1 Governing London and its infrastructure  
 
As the centre of an extensive and expanding city-region, characterised by widening 
and deepening interdependencies, with persistent fragmentation of political and 
administrative jurisdictions and a mismatch between the scale of government and 
the geographies of economic, social and land use planning processes, London has 
long exemplified the problems of unruly urban governance and ‘ungovernability’. 
From the Middle-Ages, London has asserted its economic, political and cultural 
dominance over England and the UK, and acquired a distinctive form of local 
government (Kynaston 2012). Successive monarchs enshrined the rights of the 
City of London to be governed by its own Lord Mayor elected by its livery 
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companies (guilds) (Kynaston 2012). The growth of a national government centred 
on Whitehall and Westminster formed the nucleus of a future metropolis in which 
the Crown, Parliament and the national state had a close interest and were 
geographically centralised. In England, wealth and power were concentrated in the 
emerging national and imperial capital that dominated the River Thames basin, 
ensuring that, “the combined attractions have made the tract of marsh and flat 
ground in the lower basin of the river the centre of the Arts, of the Industries, of 
the Recreations and of the moral ‘tone’, not for England alone but for wider 
regions of the earth” (Ford 1902: 46).   
 
Managing growth and collective infrastructure provision became a rising political 
problem in the early modern period as London’s expansion accelerated, spilling out 
from the old city walls. In 1580, Queen Elizabeth issued a ‘Proclamation against 
new Buildings in the Suburbs and Neighbourhood of London’ in 1580, although 
this (and later similar decrees) did nothing to prevent the extension of London 
(Archer 2001; Barnes 1970). London’s expansion was guided primarily by private 
interests in the 17th and 18th centuries, especially through the aristocratic ‘Great 
Estates’, although these were typically closely linked to the Crown. The City of 
London frequently resisted such developments, for instance, consistently opposing 
the building of a new river crossing to rival London Bridge until Parliamentary 
legislation led to the opening of Westminster Bridge in 1750. Recognising 
London’s critical role in the national economy, a series of Acts of Parliament 
created a variety of commissions concerned with paving and lighting the growing 
city (White 2010). Well-planned affluence was juxtaposed to chaotic squalor (White 
2013).  
 
The 1835 Municipal Reform Act, which initiated the era of modern English local 
government, did not apply to London, largely a result of opposition from the City 
of London (White 2016). For most of the 19th century, governance in London was 
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in the hands of vestries based on localised parish jurisdictions which promoted 
improvements to water, sanitation and other services. According to Webb (1891: 
17), local government rested “in the hands of a congeries of obscure local boards, 
the 5000 members of which, though nominally elected, [were] practically unknown, 
unchecked, unsupervised and unaudited”. Before the Metropolis Management Act 
1855, London was governed by “over 300 different parochial bodies, composed of 
about 10,000 members … controlled by several hundred private and local Acts of 
Parliament, which were practically unknown and inaccessible, except to the 
officials themselves” (Webb 1891: 19; see also Davis 1988; Gibbon and Bell 1939). 
After 1855, the Metropolitan Board of Works (MWB), responsible for sewage, 
roads and bridges, fire services and parks and open spaces, operated under the 
nominal control of the vestrymen and the counties of Middlesex, Surrey and Kent. 
However, in practice, the MWB was led by its chief engineer, Joseph Bazalgette, 
who oversaw the building of the sewage system, new roads (such as Victoria, 
Albert and Chelsea Embankments) and bridges (e.g. Albert, Putney and 
Hammersmith bridges) – many of which are the focus of renewal and 
refurbishment needs today. At the same time, infrastructure, such as railways and 
electricity was developed, in part, by private interests, (Wolmar 2012.) 
 
Vitiated local government, proliferating special-purpose joint-boards, unplanned 
private developments and corruption scandals at the MWB framed the debate 
about the reform of London local government and governance at the end of the 
19th century. At this time of imperial dominance, London was expanding to 
become the largest city in the western world. According to White (2005: 80), “Over 
the years, experience showed that it was better to absorb special-purpose boards 
authorities into generic local government providing the widest range of services”, 
which offered “the capacity to secure a wider vision”. The establishment of the 
elected London County Council (LCC) in 1889 was the result. The LCC inherited 
the powers of the MWB and gradually acquired further competences. In 1904, it 
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took over the London School Board and later responsibility for tramways, railways 
and buses through the London Passenger Transport Board, public assistance, 
health and sanitation, housing and limited land-use planning, regulation and 
licensing, and emergency services except policing (Morrison 1935).  
 
Alongside the LCC, 28 Metropolitan Boroughs were created, signalling the end of 
the existing vestries and local boards, although the City of London remained 
unreformed. This governance system was funded largely from local taxation and 
lacked equalisation and redistribution mechanisms. This was also an era of 
municipal enterprise. In 1911, in the LCC jurisdiction, alongside 13 privately-
owned systems, there were 15 local authority-owned electric supply utilities. 
Fragmentation and a lack of standardisation resulted in the use of different 
frequencies and voltages and fierce local competition, but also co-operation to 
resist efforts to modernise the sector (Hughes 1983). White (2015: 74, 75) 
identifies “a brief heyday of local democracy between 1930 and the summer of 
1948” during which “whole spheres of public life were owned and managed locally 
that are now seen as entirely the province of national government or the private 
sector”. After 1945, key functions of the LCC, notably health and electricity, were 
nationalised becoming the responsibility of central government quangos, thus 
beginning the long and incremental reduction in the autonomy of local 
government in London and across the rest of the UK (Travers and Esposito 2003). 
 
London’s continued growth and expansion revealed the limits of the LCC as a 
governance structure before the Second World War “as large urban authorities 
were increasingly expected to be regional and strategic, managing the economic life 
of the city and its hinterland. Few if any came close to achieving this aim, of 
course, but the LCC fell further short of this goal than most city authorities” 
(Davis 2001: 55; see also Robson 1939). Consideration of the governance of 
London began to be connected with the framework of town and country planning 
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that was enacted in 1947 and exemplified by Patrick Abercrombie’s Greater 
London Plan (1944), which sought to effect land-use planning on a regional scale 
and operated alongside the Metropolitan Green Belt aimed at restricting urban 
growth. The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 
(Herbert Commission) was created in 1957 to investigate and make 
recommendations on metropolitan reform. A long struggle preceded the London 
Government Act 1963 which established the Greater London Council (GLC) and 
32 London Boroughs, again leaving the City of London untouched (Travers 2015) 
(Figure 1). Herbert had originally proposed the creation of 52 boroughs but the 
new arrangements brought most of Middlesex, plus parts of Essex, Kent and 
Surrey, a small part of Hertfordshire and the County Boroughs of Croydon and 
East and West Ham into Greater London.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The 32 London Boroughs and the City of London 
Source: Map drawn by Colin Wymer adapted from London Online (n.d)  
 
Planning controversies were the hallmark of the GLC-era, specifically concerning 
comprehensive urban development, but the GLC’s powers were constrained. The 
GLC had ambitions to create a system of urban motorways during the 1970s but 
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the plans ran into strong opposition from some Boroughs and environmental 
groups. The GLC only gained control of public transport in London from the 
London Transport Board in 1970, and it also had a statutory responsibility for 
producing the Greater London Development Plan. Hall’s (1963) London 2000 
called for a wider vision for the planning of the whole of London and south-east 
England before the GLC was established, anticipating the future growth of a 
‘mega-city-region’. Wider regional planning was achieved only fitfully and partially 
until the GLC was abolished in 1986 and its powers transferred to the London 
Boroughs and central government-appointed bodies.  
 
After 1986, the London Boroughs and the City of London inherited many of the 
GLC’s responsibilities, and new joint committees were established, including the 
London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC), which advised on London-wide 
planning matters between 1986 and 2000 (Travers 2015). Travers suggests that the 
LPAC provided the intellectual basis for planning and development in London 
during this period and in the run-up to the creation of the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) in 2000. However, the array of committees and informal ad-hoc 
arrangements, which included inter-Borough partnerships (Travers 2003), led some 
to push for greater strategic coherence and transparency as London became a city 
that possessed many forms of government but limited direct political power 
(Travers and Jones 1997). London’s gap in strategic governance coincided with low 
levels of infrastructure spending in the UK. Although major infrastructure projects 
in London were completed via the central government-appointed London 
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), charged with the regeneration of 
former industrial areas in East London between 1981 and 1998 in an arrangement 
that largely excluded local government. The creation of the LDDC signalled the 
start of a new assessment of London as a location for growth rather than a place 
where development should be constrained, fuelled by the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation 
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of financial services in 1986 and the growth of the City. Notably, these investments 
underpinned the emergence of a new financial district at Canary Wharf. 
 
Since 1999, London Borough leaders and the Mayor of London have formed a 
distinctive ‘global city’ governance arrangement for London operating under the 
auspices of the GLA (Travers 2015). A principal reason for the creation of the 
GLA was that the in situ governance arrangements for London were deemed 
inadequate to support and sustain London’s growing global reputation and status 
(Syrett 2006). Syrett (2006) questions whether the structures introduced in London 
have proved fit-for-purpose and capable of addressing the complex set of issues 
presented by London’s growing geography, economy and population, including 
demands for new infrastructure, harnessing strategic governance and responding to 
increasing pressure to source new capital investment. However, Travers (2015: 
349) in contrasting what he defines as London’s administrative “bottom-heavy 
two-tier” governance architecture with that of New York (which has 5 boroughs 
with little influence), Paris (20 arrondissements but the Mayor of Paris and city 
council hold the real power) and Berlin (12 boroughs subordinate to the city 
senate) (Table 4), suggests that the London model is “probably a good one to run a 
large city”. The status of the London Boroughs was enhanced after the abolition of 
the GLC in 1986, and the powers invested in the GLA were done so in a way not 
to threaten the Boroughs (Tomaney 2001).  
 
City2 Population (2015) Area (sq. km) Governance 
London 8,673,713 1,572 Elected Mayor, 
Assembly, 32 
Boroughs and City of 
London  
New York 8,550,405 781 Elected Mayor and 5 
Boroughs 
                                                          
2 Based on formal administrative boundaries.  
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Paris 2,229,621 105.4 Elected Mayor and 
20 Arrondissements 
Berlin 3,610,156 891.7 City Senate and 12 
Boroughs 
Table 4: Urban governance architecture of selected global cities 
Source: Authors’ research 
 
The GLA has responsibility for strategic planning, transport, police and fire 
services, with extra powers granted recently over housing, economic development, 
culture and health (Travers 2015). The Assembly scrutinises the Mayor – who 
holds the majority of the GLA’s executive powers (Tomaney 2001) – and yet both 
are served by a single executive administration, which, at times, has sparked 
tensions between the two arms of the Authority (Travers 2003). The model reflects 
attempts by the then Labour government to define the boundaries of 
responsibilities and powers between the Boroughs and the GLA (Pilgrim 2006), 
but this has also provided the ‘rationale’ for continued and significant interventions 
and involvement by the UK government in the direct governance of London 
(Tomaney 2001). London’s national importance has made it an issue for national 
government.  
 
The creation of the GLA formed a major component of New Labour’s 
constitutional reforms, and was expected to lay the ground for similar changes in 
the governance of other major cities and city-regions in England (Tomaney 2001). 
Most commentators defined London’s devolved governance as a local government 
initiative (Tomaney 2001), which explains, in part, the relative weakness of 
London’s devolved system, especially when compared to Scotland and Wales. The 
creation of a directly-elected mayor was said to present an opportunity to better 
co-ordinate and manage complex issues and institutional relationships (Stoker 
2000), provide the space for a ‘business-like’ leader to emerge who would seek 
pragmatic deal-making (Barber 2013,), and facilitate greater private sector 
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collaboration and investment in urban development and infrastructure along the 
lines of city mayors in the United States (Tomaney 2001).  
 
The GLA and the London Councils group of Boroughs continue to press for 
further fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation from national 
government (London Finance Commission 2013; GLA/London Councils 2015). 
Elsewhere in England, local government institutions have also been seeking greater 
‘devolved’ powers and responsibilities to plan and invest in new urban 
infrastructure (O’Brien and Pike 2015). The process of revision is an endemic 
feature of the governance of London and symptomatic of its ‘ungovernability’, 
with the administrative geography and wider global city-region having the “longest 
experience of wrestling with the problems of how a large, diverse and spatially 
extended urban agglomeration can sustain itself, in economic, environmental, 
social and political terms” (Gordon 2016: 33). As Pilgrim (2006: 224) notes: 
 
[T]here is never a fixed and durable ‘constitutional settlement’ for the 
governance of London. And there is a remarkable pace of change…since 
1898 up to and including the implementation of the Greater London 
Authority Act 1999, London’s governance had gone through six major 
changes, while New York’s had changed little.  
 
The flux in London’s governance amplifies the argument surrounding the 
ungovernability of global cities and city-regions. The historical evolution of 
London’s governance arrangements, coupled with its sheer size and scale (Gordon 
2016), means that London has struggled to find settled structures capable of 
addressing the contradictions and tensions generated by the challenge of planning, 
governing, funding and financing infrastructure in a growing global city-region that 
transcends formal administrative boundaries.  
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4.2 The anatomy of London’s recent economic ‘boom’ and infrastructure 
overload 
 
 
The contribution in one area of such a large proportion of the national 
population as is contained in Greater London, and the attraction to the 
Metropolis of the best industrial, financial, commercial and general ability, 
represents a serious drain on the rest of the country (Royal Commission on 
the Distribution of the Industrial Population [Barlow Commission], 1940, 
para 171).  
 
For a large part of the post-1945 period, London was in economic and 
demographic decline. Towards the end of the 1970s, deindustrialisation had 
become a distinctive feature of UK cities and city-regions, with London losing 
over 40 percent of manufacturing jobs between 1960 and 1978 (Martin et al. 2014). 
At the beginning of the 1970s, manufacturing employed over one million workers 
in London, but by 2008 this had fallen to 216,000, with implications for 
infrastructure assets linked to the transportation of goods, such as ports, freight 
and river crossings, and emergent innovations in communications infrastructure in 
response to particular changes in manufacturing organisation and technology 
(Luger et al. 2013). Although job growth, especially in business services, began to 
increase in the 1980s, it was not until after 1991 that employment accelerated, and 
formed the basis of a turnaround in London’s growth underpinned by the dramatic 
expansion of ‘high-value’ financial and knowledge-intensive business services 
fuelled by deregulation and new technology. In the 18th century, London ranked 
alongside Amsterdam and Paris as one of the world’s leading international financial 
centres, and although Amsterdam was overtaken by Berlin and New York in the 
19th century, London retained its prominent position. The 20th century was marked 
by an international financial system organised and controlled largely by London, 
New York and Tokyo (GaWC 1999), while the 21st century has seen London 
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secure the mantle of premier global banking and financial centre (Cassis 2010). 
From 1991 to 2008, London underwent an economic renaissance with almost 
930,000 net jobs in services created (Martin 2013). The concentration of high 
growth sectors ensured that London was the fastest growing city-region and region 
in the UK (Figure 2). Between 2009 and 2014, London’s economy grew by 28.9 
per cent, with significant growth in real estate (81.7 per cent), accommodation and 
food services (45.5 per cent), business support services (42.9 per cent), and 
construction (42.8 per cent) (ONS 2015). Gordon (2016a) attributes London’s 
growth, particularly in central London, in the wake of the global financial crisis, to 
four events. First, the depreciation in sterling boosted international tourism in 
which London has managed to attract a significant percentage of total UK trade. 
Second, there has been a huge expansion in business head office employment in 
London. Third, major investments have taken place in two large-scale 
infrastructure projects (Crossrail and 2012 Olympics), said to be a reflection of 
“elite choices about resource allocation and restructuring in the face of a general 
fiscal/commercial squeeze” (Gordon 2016a: 335). Fourth, there has been 
significant investment in health and higher education employment in London, 
while London has also benefited economically from UK taxpayer guarantees to the 
banking and financial services sector, as well as from Bank of England quantitative 
easing, which has inflated asset prices and company balance sheets (Gordon 
2016a). However, London’s employment growth has not necessarily been 
translated into expected additional tax revenues (McGough and Piazza 2016). This 
fiscal shortfall has implications for how new infrastructure is funded and financed 
in London. A key challenge facing policy-makers is how to encourage ‘new and 
innovative’ financial practices and mechanisms, some combined into multiple 
funding and financing packages, to emerge. Brexit is also presenting potential new 
challenges (GLA 2018). London’s economy is integrated closely with the rest of 
the Europe Union (EU), in particular in business and financial services, and it has a 
diverse labour market containing a large proportion of EU27 workers (GLA 2016).  
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Figure 2: Cumulative percentage point differential growth gaps of GVA (2011 prices): 
The North, South and London, 1971-2013 
Source: Adapted from Martin et al. (2015: 5) 
 
International inward migration contributed significantly to London’s population 
and economic growth from the late 1990s onwards (Gordon et al. 2004) (Figure 3). 
The UK’s migrant population is heavily-concentrated in London, with 37 per cent 
of people living in London born outside the UK, compared with 13 per cent in the 
UK as a whole (Hawkins 2016). Migration and population growth has driven 
London’s recent economic boom, placing new demands on London’s 
infrastructure across all sectors, which are said to require new long-term 
investment and renewal (Mayor of London 2015).  
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Figure 3: Resident Population in London (1999-2014) 
Source: ONS Population Estimates 
 
London has been singled out as the ‘global powerhouse’ of the UK economy, a 
source of foreign earnings, tax contributions, and a place that demands goods and 
services from the rest of the country (Greater London Authority 2016). With a 
long-established core of financial and business services, the growth of these 
activities from the late-1980s, coupled with London’s scale and distinct place 
within the UK political economy (Gardiner et al. 2013), has seen the London global 
city-region embark upon a growth path largely denied to other UK cities and city-
regions (Martin et al. 2015). 
 
The UK’s financial system is overwhelmingly concentrated in and controlled from 
London, and national monetary policy has long served the interests of London’s 
‘financial nexus’ (Harvey 2012; Gordon 2016a). London’s central importance as a 
global financial centre is said to encourage large capital outflows, exacerbating 
spatial disparities and reinforcing divergence between London and the rest of the 
UK (Harvey 2012). During times of major economic shocks, such as the 2007/08 
global financial crisis, which intuitively should have rendered London particularly 
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vulnerable as well as largely culpable (Wójcik 2013), London has demonstrated a 
resilience and ability to recover faster from the subsequent downturn than any 
other UK city or city-region. This has been helped by London’s ability to draw 
upon state largesse in the form of “bail-outs, implicit subsidy and quantitative 
easing…[which] have been translated specifically into employment/spending 
power within London and overseas rather than elsewhere within the UK” (Gordon 
2016a: 336). This, in part, provides an explanation for London’s ability largely to 
escape the consequences of the financial crash and great recession. But equally it 
has fuelled new speculative and risk-based paths of asset and property 
development in central London (Gordon 2016a), exacerbating spatial and income 
inequalities within and across the city-region and consequences for affordable 
housing and intra-urban and urban-suburban transport infrastructure.  
 
London’s economic boom has been underpinned and shaped to a large extent by a 
global-national-local nexus of capital and labour that has ensured London remains 
dominant within the UK political economy. The financial crash impacted upon 
London to a lesser extent that many other cities and city-regions, which were far-
removed from the banking and financial service sector decision-making apparatus, 
but whose communities felt the fall-out of residential sub-prime mortgage lending, 
and resultant economic contraction and austerity. In pledging billions of pounds 
towards underwriting banks, and within the sphere of major infrastructure 
spending, London has been re-affirmed as the UK’s ‘national champion’. London 
has been drawing in international, national and local state and private capital to 
underpin the city-region’s economy and built environment and satisfy demands for 
new investment to renew and maintain critical assets and manage growth. These 
processes, pursued through the adaptation and adoption of different managerialist 
and entrepreneurial approaches and techniques, attuned to a particular London 
context, have also increased the complexity of how infrastructure is funded, 
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financed and planned, and illustrate the significant challenge in governing urban 
infrastructure in the London global city-region.  
 
5. ‘Capital connections’? Governing, funding and financing transport 
infrastructure in the London global city-region 
 
Transport infrastructure in London is a crucible of ungovernability and offers an 
instructive account of the thorny issues that public, private and civic actors 
operating across different scales face in relation to governing, funding and 
financing urban infrastructures in global cities and city-regions. Transport matters 
because of its crucial importance to the functioning of labour markets, housing 
markets, flows of goods and services, urban development, as well as productivity, 
competitiveness and social and economic inclusion (Eddington 2006). It is also the 
infrastructure sector that is the most visible within the public domain and where 
debate is most vociferous about whether decentralised governance and greater 
local control is more effective or not (Shaw 2016).  
 
 
 
5.1 The national UK context of infrastructure planning and investment in 
the London global city-region  
 
Infrastructure in the UK is said to perform relatively well compared to other 
countries, in terms of communications, electricity and gas networks, although the 
UK compares less favourably in transport, waste management, and road, rail and 
aviation capacity (HM Treasury/IUK 2011). The World Economic Forum’s 
‘quality’ benchmarking of national infrastructure ranked the UK 9th out of 138 
countries in 2015 (Schwab 2016). The UK under-invests in its infrastructure by 
international comparison, and London assumed a significant share of total national 
investment (Berry et al. 2015): recent estimates calculated that public infrastructure 
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investment allocated specifically to London represents £5305 per capita, compared 
to an UK average of £3192. Whilst it is difficult to find wholly-accurate statistics 
on total infrastructure investment in the UK and other OECD member states 
(HoC 2013; Vammalle et al. 2014), using Public Sector Net Investment as a proxy, 
total UK investment fell to 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 (£22 billion), down 
from a peak of 7.1 per cent in 1968, and is forecast to remain at 1.4 per cent of 
GDP until 2018-19. Since the 1980s, UK government investment has been lower 
than most advanced economies (OECD 2012), and significantly below the OECD 
‘recommended’ target of 3.5 per cent of annual GDP. On current estimates, the 
difference between what the UK actually spends on investment and what the 
OECD believes the UK should spend, will result in an annual funding gap of 
£40bn by 2019-20 (Coyle 2016).  
 
Infrastructure and its investment geographies have become more political and 
contested, with close scrutiny and attention being focused on the breakdown of 
territorial public expenditure on infrastructure, particularly transport. Central and 
local government and public corporation data point towards disparities between 
what London and the rest of the UK/England receive from national government 
(Figure 4). A similar spatial pattern of infrastructure investment is evident in the 
per capita amount of European Investment Bank (EIB) finance provided to 
projects in UK cities and nations over the past two decades (Figure 5). In terms of 
proposed future (public and private) infrastructure investment, of the £144bn 
allocated to the English regions in the 2017 National Infrastructure and 
Construction Pipeline, £26bn is earmarked for London, of which £16bn is for 
transport. In other regions, the energy sector is by far the biggest beneficiary of 
investment (IPA 2017).  
 
For other UK cities and regions outside the London global city-region, the 
articulation of entrepreneurial and managerial behaviours amidst constrained 
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financialisation, relatively limited decentralised powers, and modest resources 
available for city infrastructure investment allowed by and transferred from the UK 
national state as well as the limited private sector involvement has tedresulted in 
marked geographical disparities in city infrastructure provision and constricted 
urban and regional development prospects. More broadly and longer-term, such 
spatial disparities and their generative forces risk undermining the potential for city 
infrastructure and development to contribute to the UK national government’s 
stated recognition of “the need to rebalance the economy across sectors and areas 
in order to spread wealth and prosperity around the country” (May 2016). 
 
 
Figure 4: Identifiable public expenditure on transport in England, per £ head (2015-16)3 
Source: HM Treasury (2017): 176 
 
                                                          
3 ‘Public spending’ means expenditure by UK government department.  
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Figure 5: EIB investment in UK regions and nations per capita (Euro) (2001-16) 
Source: Institute for Government (2017) 
 
In an effort to develop a long-term strategic approach to infrastructure and to 
articulate a potential ‘deal-flow’ of projects attractive to international public and 
private investors, the UK’s National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) (HM Treasury/IUK 
2010; 2011; HM Treasury 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015) identified a ‘pipeline’, over the 
next decade, of over 500 planned public and private infrastructure projects costing 
£310 billion. The NIP sets out a ‘broad vision’ of the infrastructure investment 
required to support national growth (HM Treasury 2012; 2013), and outlined the 
UK government’s approach to funding and financing infrastructure, including 
greater use of government guarantees to underwrite loan agreements, sovereign 
wealth fund, and pension and insurance fund investment. Despite historic low 
interest rates, the UK government has been reluctant to increase state borrowing 
to fund and finance additional infrastructure on account of its commitment to 
reduce public debt, contrary to advice from international institutionsthat have 
called on governments to spend more on infrastructure to boost global growth 
(OECD 2016; IMF 2016). Moreover, this position runs counter to evidence 
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demonstrating that the cost of servicing private capital finance debt in the UK is 
twice the cost of servicing similar government debt (NAO 2015) (Table 5). The re-
classification of Network Rail as part of the public sector, resulting in Network 
Rail’s borrowing and debt being added to national state borrowing and debt, means 
the sector and its investment falls within the government’s sphere of managing 
total public sector expenditure (Shaw 2016). The previous Conservative 
government’s legal obligation to bring the public finances into surplus by 2019-20, 
coupled with an apparent belief within parts of the UK Treasury that the public 
sector ‘crowds-out’ private investment (Cable 2016), has compelled national state 
actors to source alternative infrastructure funding and financing mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
Type of debt Debt level over the 
year (£bn) 
Financing costs in 
year (£bn) 
Implied interest 
rate (%) 
Government 
borrowing 
965.5-996.2 33.2 3.3-3.4 
Private finance 
(including finance 
leases) 
41.4-41.9 3.1 7.4-7.5 
Table 5: Financing costs of UK government borrowing and private finance (estimated in 
2012-13 Whole of Government Accounts 
Source: NAO (2015) using data from HM Treasury (2014a) 
 
A number of government or quasi-government institutions have a direct and 
indirect responsibility for UK national infrastructure investment and delivery. The 
Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA), based in the UK Treasury, is 
responsible for co-ordinating and simplifying the planning and prioritisation of 
investment in infrastructure and achieving greater value for money on projects and 
transitions. In November 2013, the then Coalition government created the 
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Regeneration Investment Organisation (RIO), an operational arm of UK Trade 
and Investment (UKTI) to encourage international private actors to invest in large-
scale regeneration and infrastructure projects in UK cities and city-regions. The 
National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) is a new agency with the remit to assess 
and identify the UK’s strategic infrastructure needs over the next thirty years (HM 
Treasury 2016). In one of its first outputs the NIC published analysis and 
recommendations on London’s future strategic transport infrastructure (NIC 
2016), with specific reference made to proposed major projects, such as Crossrail 
2. The NIC will review the projects seeking public investment, and suggest options 
on how they should be planned, governed and funded.  
 
At local, city and city-region levels, ‘City Deals, ‘Growth Deals’, ‘Devolution Deals’ 
and other deal-making mechanisms have sought to incentivise local authorities to 
identify and prioritise ‘asks’ of UK and devolved governments, in order to fund, 
finance and deliver infrastructure and other economic development and public 
service interventions, and to reform governance structures to improve strategy 
development, planning and ‘unlock’ growth (O’Brien and Pike 2015). The deals 
have sought to encourage and promote innovation in funding and financing, 
although ‘there has been an uneven allocation of national and local state resources 
earmarked to support new initiatives (NAO 2016). The ‘deal-making’ culture is 
extending and deepening the decentralisation of public policy and governance in 
the UK (Pike et al. 2016b). While London was not formally granted a ‘City Deal’ 
initially, it nevertheless has been able informally to negotiate and reach a succession 
of agreement or ‘deals’ with the UK government that have leveraged public 
investment for new transport infrastructure. In November 2017, the Mayor of 
London and London Councils did sign a Devolution Deal with government and 
National Heath Service to improve health and social care services in London (GLA 
2017).  
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A key line of enquiry concerning geographies of investment and public expenditure 
is the extent to which cities and city-regions in the UK, including London, have 
sufficient fiscal ‘space’ (Vammalle et al. 2014) to deploy tax and borrowing 
mechanisms to plan, fund, finance and maintain new urban infrastructure. The UK 
has a highly-centralised system of taxation and expenditure in an international 
context (Travers 2012), and British local authorities have limited local fiscal 
autonomy and rely heavily upon inter-governmental transfers (Table 6). The 
London Finance Commission, launched by Mayor Johnson, called on national 
government to devolve the full range of property taxes (council tax, business rates, 
stamp duty land tax, annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains (i.e. 
‘Mansion Tax’)) to London (London Finance Commission 2013), while other cities 
and city-regions have lobbied for devolved power over property taxes, limited 
powers to raise consumption taxes (i.e. Value Added Tax), and new borrowing 
powers. However, in the absence of national equalisation and distributive 
mechanisms, a narrow definition of fiscal decentralisation, stemming from a 
highly-competitive model of urban development, could harden and even widen 
inequalities between core (larger and higher level tax base) and peripheral (smaller 
and lower level tax base) places. The spatial imbalances in the tax raising capacity 
of local areas in England are significant, including those between London and the 
so-called ‘second city-region’ – Greater Manchester (Figure 6). 
 
 Municipal operating 
expenditures per 
capita (£) 
Municipal taxes 
(local and shared 
taxes per capita) (£) 
London – GLA plus Boroughs (2011) 3,199 476 
Berlin 4,910 2,570 
New York 4,561 3,078 
Paris 2,699 1,896 
Tokyo 3,301 2,312 
Table 6: Municipal operating expenditures and taxes per capita 
Source: Adapted from Slack (2013: 5) 
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Figure 6: Forecast business rate income (2016/17), per £ head 
Source: DCLG (2016) 
 
The call by London and elsewhere for greater fiscal autonomy to help generate 
new sources of infrastructure funding and financing has come at a time when local 
government has faced major budget reducations. Central government funding for 
councils in England was reduced by 37 per cent between 2010-11 and 2015-16 
(NAO 2014). New arrangements for funding councils have been introduced in 
England and Wales, including schemes to enable local authorities to retain 50 per 
cent of the growth in local business rates (or taxes). Pilot exercises have been 
launched in London, Manchester and Liverpool where local areas can trial the 
process of retaining 100 per cent of business rate growth. The UK government has 
offered local authorities in England four-year funding settlements and ‘full control’ 
of all business rate revenues by 2020 (HM Treasury 2015). However, government 
proposals to introduce tax relief for small businesses could see councils facing 
further reductions in revenue (Butler 2016), and (re)confirms the historic role of 
central government exercising and retaining control over local government in the 
UK. The proposed changes in how local authorities are funded could directly 
influence the nature of the built environment in cities and city-regions. Particular 
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forms of urban development may be prioritised as assets generating higher 
business rate income are encouraged. Local government faces a difficult choice in 
deciding what kind of urban development to support and where. If authorities 
become dependent on business rate income to fund infrastructure and core public 
services, they may release more local land and property for employment. However, 
if authorities are able to generate more revenue through residential real estate 
development, they may bring forward housing schemes. The use of specific fiscal 
incentives to ‘encourage’ particular forms of development in the face of austerity is 
evident in London: 
 
Facing sharp reductions to their day-to-day budgets and to capital spending, 
London Boroughs and the Mayor have turned their attention to the 
construction of often densely packed housing developments to bring in 
additional resources (Travers 2015: 293). 
 
The London Economic Development Strategy (EDS) sets out the Mayor’s long-
term vision for London’s economy. As London’s Local Enterprise Partnership 
(LEP), the London Enterprise Panel is one of 39 LEPs in England. LEPs are local 
public-private economic development bodies established and designated by central 
government in 2010/11 to replace statutory Regional Development Agencies 
(NAO 2016a). The London LEP is chaired by the Mayor of London (Pike et al. 
2015), and it prepares an Economic Development Plan (EDP) that is expected to 
fit within the framework of the Mayor’s EDS. In February 2015, the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mayor of London published a joint economic 
plan (2015-2030) for London, which included the objective of securing “London’s 
strong economic future by setting the ambition to outpace the growth of New 
York, adding £6.4bn to the London economy by 2030” (HM Treasury/Mayor of 
London 2015).   
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5.2 Strategic spatial planning in the London global city-region 
 
The funding, financing and governance of infrastructure enjoys a distinct 
relationship with spatial planning. Strategic spatial planning within the 
administrative boundaries of London is the shared responsibility of the Mayor of 
London, the London Boroughs and the City of London. As the Mayor’s strategic 
planning document, the spatial plans of the London Borough and City of London 
must conform with the London Plan. The Mayor has to keep the London Plan 
under review, and to provide an integrated and over-arching economic, 
environmental, transport and social framework for the spatial development of 
London over a 25-year period. In its current guise, the Plan has identified 38 
‘Opportunity Areas’ for new housing and commercial development and 7 
‘Intensification Areas’ (Figure 7), which are earmarked to provide land for 575,000 
new jobs and 303,000 new homes (London First 2015). The Mayor has 
responsibility for designating the Opportunity Areas, while the Boroughs lead on 
development activity within the Opportunity Areas. 
 
 
Figure 7: Opportunity Areas and Densification Areas in London 
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Source: Mayor of London (2015), map drawn by Colin Wymer.  
 
Opportunity Areas Opportunity Areas Areas for Intensification 
1 Bexley Riverside 20 Lewisham, Catford & New 
Cross 
39 Farringdon/Smithfield 
2 Bromley 21 London Bridge, Borough & 
Bankside 
40 Haringey Heartlands/Wood 
Green 
3 Canada Water 22 London Riverside 41 Holborn 
4 Charlton Riverside 23 Lower Lee Valley (including 
Stratford) 
42 Kidbrooke 
5 City Fringe/Tech City 24 Old Kent Road 43 Mill Hill East 
6 Colindale/Burnt Oak 25 Paddington 44 South Wimbledon/Colliers 
Wood 
7 Cricklewood/Brent Cross 26 Park Royal 45 West Hampstead Interchange 
8 Croydon 27 Old Oak Common  
9 Deptford Creek/Greenwich 
Riverside 
28 Royal Docks and Beckton 
Waterfront 
 
10 Earls Court & West Kensington 29 Southall  
11 Elephant & Castle 30 Thamesmead & Abbey Wood  
12 Euston 31 Tottenham Court Road  
13 Greenwich Peninsula 32 Upper Lee Valley  
14 Harrow & Wealdstone 33 Vauxhall, Nine Elms & 
Battersea 
 
15 Heathrow 34 Victoria  
16 Ilford 35 Waterloo  
17 Isle of Dogs 36 Wembley  
18 Kensal Canalside 37 White City  
19 King's Cross - St Pancras 38 Woolwich  
 
 
Since 2010, changes to strategic planning in England have attempted to reduce the 
cost of infrastructure delivery (HM Treasury 2010), which has been influenced, in 
part, by claims that certain planning policy interventions – notably restrictions on 
development in the Green Belt – stall development (Cheshire and Hilber 2008), 
stifle growth (Overman 2013), and contribute towards over-inflated property 
prices and rising living costs due to restrictions on new housing supply (Nathan 
and Overman 2011). Alternative perspectives claim that spatial planning delivers 
unique value by stimulating market activity (Adams and Watkins 2014), and that a 
formal, regulated planning system is needed to ensure that housing and other 
strategic infrastructure is built when needed and maintained (Haughton et al. 2014). 
The Localism Act 2011 and the 2012 National Planning Policy Framework 
established a new local planning architecture in England to replace regional spatial 
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planning (Smith 2013). The Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 attempted to 
further ‘streamline’ the local planning system. A ‘duty to cooperate’ was introduced 
requiring neighbouring local planning authorities to work together on transport, 
flood protection, housing and other infrastructure issues (DCLG 2011), although 
there is no formal duty to reach agreement. The London Plan is not covered by the 
duty to co-operate, but the Mayor is required to consult with the London 
Boroughs and neighbouring local authorities that border the administrative 
boundaries of London but lie within the broader global city-region.  
 
Dealing with the implications of population growth raises a particular challenge for 
the planning, governance, funding, financing, operation and maintenance of 
infrastructure in the London global city-region, which covers a large area as 
evidenced by its labour market geography (Figure 8). There is no formal strategic 
planning framework covering the London global city-region. Within the city-region 
there are noticeable differences in the institutional capacity, statutory 
responsibilities and resources of the GLA, London Boroughs and local authorities 
and LEPs in south east England, which makes governance, long-term planning and 
assembling public and private infrastructure funding and financing at the city-
region level difficult. Some local authorities are said to act for local interests rather 
than those of the city-region, “The loss of regional planning means that local self-
interest overrides economic functionality” (South East local authority chief 
executive, Authors’ Interview, 2016). The Mayor, Boroughs, south east local 
authorities and LEPs have attempted to address the challenge of ungovernability 
by working through the voluntary ‘Wider South East Summit’, which advocates 
hope will enable more development to be planned jointly, while larger geography 
and institutional scales are used to pool resources, share risk and raise capital to 
invest in infrastructure that benefits the city-region as a whole. However, in a 
further illustration of the centralised nature of the UK political economy, and the 
continued intervention of national government in the governance of London, the 
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Planning Minister, Brandon Lewis, restated the government’s position on strategic 
spatial planning in the London global city-region a letter to Boris Johnson:  
 
I note your obligation and welcome your commitment to work closely with 
local authorities and other partners outside London as part of the full scale 
review of the London Plan. Authorities outside London face their own 
issues and challenges in meeting their needs, which may impact on their 
ability to accumulate any of London’s unmet housing needs. This 
Government abolished the top-down Regional Strategies, which built up 
nothing but resentment and we have no intention of resurrecting 
SERPLAN or the South East Plan from the dead (Lewis 2015). 
 
 
Figure 8: % of  working residents, by local authority, who commute to London (2011) 
Source: ONS (2014) 
 
Institutional reform represents a policy response to local fragmentation and an 
attempt to improve the planning, governance and investment in urban 
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infrastructure and development (Storper 2014). Research suggests that effective 
strategic governance can play a positive role in the economic performance of cities 
and city-regions (Ahrend et al. 2014). The establishment of Métropole du Grand 
Paris, and the Greater Sydney Growth Commission’s statutory plan for the Sydney 
metropolitan area, demonstrates how local and national actors are continually 
seeking to improve the co-ordination, planning and governance of global city-
regions to support the funding and financing of critical infrastructure (GSC 2016). 
London’s particular and distinct geography, and complex governability, has 
resulted in a “number of ad-hoc solutions to the city’s governance problems” 
(Travers 2015: 26), while there have long been arguments for planning and co-
ordinating infrastructure and development both within and beyond London’s 
administrative boundaries (Hall 1989) as “urban geographers and planners have 
generally viewed London as an area of economic and social activity that extends far 
beyond the continuous built-up area of the city” (Travers 2015: 337).  
 
Unlike most global city-regions, London had, until recently, not produced an 
infrastructure strategy. London is said to face, despite major national government 
investment, an infrastructure funding short-fall, by international comparison, with 
London spending 5 per cent of annual Gross Value Added (GVA) on 
infrastructure while competitors invest up to 12 per cent per annum (Travers 
2013). The London Infrastructure Plan (LIP) 2050 (Mayor of London 2014), sets 
out a pipeline of proposed new investment in transport, housing, green 
infrastructure, digital, energy, water and waste infrastructure, totalling £1.3 trillion, 
which London is forecast to need between 2016 and 2050 (Table 7). The 
development of a pipeline and deal flow of infrastructure projects and programmes 
in London mirrors that of the UK’s National Infrastructure Plan and is designed to 
instil and sustain investor confidence, and provides an example of how national 
and local state actors embrace and combine entrepreneurial and managerial 
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urbanism by seeking to attract private investment while adopting more strategic 
and planned approaches to urban infrastructure renewal.  
 
Infrastructure type Capital expenditure (£bn) % Total 
Housing 547 42 
Transport 466 35 
Energy 148 11 
Schools 68 5 
Water 49 4 
Green 22 2 
Waste 14 1 
Digital 8 1 
Total 1,324 100 
Table 7: Estimated required infrastructure expenditure in London (2016-2050) by sector  
Source: Arup (2014) 
 
The Mayor of London is required to produce a Transport Strategy setting out a 
long-term vision for how transport services will be delivered by London’s strategic 
transport authority – Transport for London (TfL) – and partners, including the 
London Boroughs and the City of London. The Transport Strategy has to align 
with the London Plan, and the Mayor’s EDS (Mayor of London 2010), and the 
performance of TfL is monitored continually and reported publically each year. 
Capturing the symptoms of London’s infrastructure overload, the NIC (NIC 2016) 
has suggested that London would reach ‘mega city’ status by 2030, exacerbating 
existing housing shortages and placing further pressure on the city-region’s 
transport infrastructure. The Commission identified four specific challenges: 
overcrowding on major London Underground lines; limited capacity on commuter 
rail routes and in Network Rail stations; insufficient orbital links around the city-
region, especially east London; and the need for transport to promote and increase 
housing growth. The NIC also recommended government approval for Crossrail 2 
(see below). 
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Linked to transport capacity, housing is arguably the most pressing issue facing the 
London global city-region (Cochrane and Colenutt 2015), and is integral to the 
new demands and stresses being placed upon London’s existing infrastructure 
assets and systems. With the population in London’s administrative geography set 
to rise to over 10 million by 2030, increasing housing supply is a major priority: 
 
Housing is a massive issue. There is little open space. We have seen house 
prices rising and we need to find space for new homes. We have seen a 26 
per cent increase in house prices because of Crossrail. We can’t meet the 
demand. People are being pushed out from the London market and house 
prices are being pushed up (South East England local authority chief 
executive, Authors’ Interview, 2016). 
 
International private investment in central London has been a major driver of the 
residential property market (Atkinson et al. 2016), with two-thirds of the £1m-plus 
homes bought for cash in the UK, since 2011, purchased in London (Kollewe 
2016). Almost ten per cent of properties in the City of Westminster are owned by 
offshore companies (Transparency International 2015). Chinese investment in 
London real estate totalled £7bn between 2005 and 2014, compared with £5.2bn 
of Chinese investment in UK infrastructure over the same period (Pinsent 
Masons/CEBR 2014). Before the EU referendum in June 2016, demand for 
London real estate was continuing to grow, with £560m worth of deals completed 
by Chinese investors between 1 January and 29 February 2016 (Vyas 2016). 
Although high property prices in London (Figure 9) – for owner-occupied and 
rented sectors – are driving values upwards, and strengthening property as a 
financial asset, London is becoming more expensive and unaffordable as a 
residential and business location. Towns such as Reading – to the west of London 
– and adjacent to the M4 motorway and new Crossrail rail line, have seen 
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significant house price growth, with prices in December 2015 rising by over 17 per 
cent on the previous year (MacDonald-Read 2016). However, the global nature of 
London’s real estate and property markets means that residential property prices 
are particularly vulnerable to external shocks and financial instability (Wright 2016).  
 
The rise in property and land values, and private wealth accrued through state-led 
transport infrastructure improvements, is raising questions about how public 
authorities in London can introduce new speculative funding and financing 
mechanisms that simultaneously embody managerial forms of regulation that 
enable the state to capture financial gains from land and property value uplift that 
can be redirected into new public transport infrastructure and services (CBRE 
2013; NAO 2014a). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: House price index (average price (£)) by region in England and Wales (2015) 
Source: Land Registry (2015) 
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not responsible for building and managing social housing (Travers 2015). The 
London Assembly reviews the Mayor’s Housing Strategy, and can recommend 
improvements. The London Plan had an initial target of 32,000 new homes to be 
built per year in London (Mayor of London 2016), but this has been revised 
upwards to 42,000 new dwellings per annum. A strategic housing assessment 
suggests that if London wants to meet its long-term housing needs over the next 
two decades then it needs to build 50,000 new homes per year, and if it wants to 
achieve the same target within the next decade it needs to build 60,000 per annum 
(Mayor of London 2013). There is a particular challenge in identifying land for 
housing, and increasing housing supply within London’s administrative boundaries 
and broader city-region, which is why ‘green belt’ development is being proposed 
(Shelter 2016; Clark et al. 2014).  
 
In June 2015, Boris Johnson announced the creation of 20 new housing zones, 
with ‘relaxed’ planning rules, in an attempt to build 50,000 new homes by 2025. 
The zones have been set to receive a share of £400m in central government and 
GLA loans to remediate brownfield land and deliver infrastructure, and the 
Boroughs will be responsible for delivering new housing in return for investment. 
In March 2016, Johnson announced 11 new zones to provide 24,554 new homes, 
equipped with a further £200m of investment. The public sector is also being 
asked to sell and/or release public land in London for housing. The London Land 
Commission is compiling a register of all publically-owned land and property in 
London, across national, city-region and local institutions, in order to identify 
‘surplus public assets’ that could be disposed of or sold to private developers for 
new housing schemes (Mayor of London 2016a). 
 
The growth in population and overload in London’s transport, housing and other 
infrastructure illustrates the challenges that public, private and civic actors face in 
governing, funding and financing urban infrastructures, and how governance is 
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complex within a global city-region that encompasses many different international, 
national and local public and private institutions and actors engaged either formally 
and/or informally. The narrative of strategic (including infrastructure) planning in 
the London global city-region sheds light on the nexus between planning, housing 
and transport, and how the governance, funding and financing of infrastructure is 
shaped by varying spatial and temporal-specific conditions and institutions. New 
and additional infrastructure fixes for London, without similar or reciprocal 
investment elsewhere in the UK, risks undermining efforts by the national 
government to reduce regional disparities through sectoral and spatial 
‘rebalancing’. Partly in response to the political sensitivity surrounding London’s 
priviledged position in the hierarchy of territorial spending on infrastructure, actors 
in the London global city-region are adopting pragmatic approaches and 
assembling investment packages which are increasingly based on the rediscovery 
and adaptation of municipal entrepreneurialism and managerialism for urban 
infrastructure provision and renewal. 
 
5.3 Governing, funding and financing transport infrastructure in the 
London global city-region 
 
The strategic management and governance of transport assets and services in 
London has undergone numerous revisions, and it was not until the 1960s that 
London had its first strategic and unified transport system under the GLC and 
London Transport. In 1984, in advance of the abolition of the GLC, control of 
London Transport was transferred to a nationalised board appointed by the UK 
government, which also took over the management of London’s transport strategy. 
Between 1985 and the establishment of the GLA in 2000, the governance of 
London's transport became splintered, but the deep institutional roots of public 
sector-led urban managerialism for collective provision in transport infrastructure 
were strengthened. London’s road network was the responsibility of the Highways 
Agency, London Boroughs and the Traffic Director for London. London 
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Transport managed London Underground and bus services; and over-ground 
trains were run by British Rail and private operators.  
 
In the 1990s, London’s business community, led by London First, lobbied 
vociferously for a new strategic transport body (Travers 2015), thus demonstrating 
the influence of private interests keen to push urban entrepreneurial and 
managerialist institutional solutions to address London’s economic, planning and 
infrastructure challenges. The Labour Government’s 1997 consultation paper on 
the GLA (DETR 1997) proposed three objectives for transport in London: first, 
an integrated and sustainable transport strategy for London; second, a unified body 
for transport on a London-wide scale; and third, to define the different 
responsibilities for transport in London between central government, the GLA and 
the London Boroughs. Under the GLA Act 1999, ’London’s buses, trains, 
underground system, traffic lights, taxis and river transport were brought under the 
control of TfL.  
 
TfL is a hybrid entrepreneurial/managerialist institution with origins in a previous 
earlier era of municipal entrepreneurialism. It has institutional control over 
strategic transport planning in London and a role that sees it simultaneously 
engaged increasingly in entrepreneurial and speculative financialised activity in an 
attempt to raise capital and revenue. Given the size and complexity of global city-
regions, and the challenge of governing, planning and investing in urban 
infrastructure across multiple units of local government, institutions such as TfL 
have to adopt a variety of approaches to raising large amounts of infrastructure 
funding and financing from public and private actors.  
 
TfL is a transport authority that is answerable to city government. The Mayor of 
London has significant control over TfL, with the power to issue guidance and 
directions over TfL duties, operations and policies, whilst TfL has general powers 
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to form companies and make agreements to transfer property, rights and liabilities. 
However, TfL is constrained by powers held by the UK government and by its 
under-bounded administrative geography, which does not extend far out into the 
wider city-region, unlike equivalent transport authorities in Paris and New York, 
which have jurisdiction across large metropolitan regions (Table 8), although the 
City of Paris is much smaller geographically and in population terms than either 
London or New York. 
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Table 8: Metropolitan Transport Governance in London, Paris and New York 
City 
 
Transport 
Authority 
Geography Governance Funding/Financing  Responsibilities 
London 
 
Transport for 
London (TfL) 
 
Greater London 
Authority (GLA) area (32 
Boroughs plus City of 
London), population of 
8.6m. Manages some 
Tube and rail services 
beyond GLA boundary.  
Statutory body and 
agency of GLA. TfL 
Board chaired by Mayor 
of London.  
 
2015/16 budget: £7bn 
revenue; £4bn capital. 
Income from fares, fees, 
charges, assets, reserves 
and council tax. £1.8bn 
in revenue and capital 
grant from UK 
government, including 
ring-fenced funding for 
Crossrail. Retains local 
business rates for 
investment projects. Has 
issued bonds. 
Development tax for 
some projects.  
Duty to prepare 
transport strategy. 
Strategic responsibility 
for: London Rail and 
Underground; Crossrail 
and surface transport 
(buses, cycling, taxis, 
congestion charge, local 
highways, river services 
and coach stations).  
Paris 
 
Syndicate des 
Transport d’Ile de 
France (STIF) 
 
Paris (Ile de France) 
region covering 12m 
people.  
Created in 1959 by the 
French government, 
which chaired STIF until 
2005. Now chaired by 
elected president of Paris 
region. A syndicate of the 
region, the city of Paris, 7 
départements and other 
partners. Board of 29 
members: 15 (region); 5 
(city) and 7 
(départements). 1 
representative of 
2015 budget: 5.5bn 
Euros operating; 1.03bn 
Euro investment. Grant 
income (state, region and 
department), and 
Versement Transport 
(VT) – a hypothecated 
employer tax. Income 
subsidises operator 
losses, contributes to 
asset modernisation. 
Investment costs shared 
with government, local 
authorities and operators.  
Organising, modernising 
and financing public 
transport. Co-ordinates 
transport operators, 
determines routes, 
timetables, modes, 
operating conditions, 
fares, budgets, and 
manages operator 
subsidies and major 
investments. 
 67 
 
City 
 
Transport 
Authority 
Geography Governance Funding/Financing  Responsibilities 
towns/villages in region, 
and 1 business.  
New York 
 
Metropolitan 
Transportation 
Authority (MTA) 
 
5,000-square-mile area, 
including New York City 
through Long Island, 
south-eastern New York 
State and Connecticut – 
population of 15.2m.  
Transport system 
governed by municipal, 
state, and bi-state 
authorities. A public 
benefit corporation, 
governed by 22 board 
members representing 5 
NYC boroughs and each 
county in the New York 
State service area.  
2015 budget: operating 
$14bn, with 50% spent 
on MTA transit (subways 
and buses), 18% 
commuter rail lines and 
17% debt servicing. 
Revenues from fares 
(40%), taxes (35%), tolls 
(12%) and state/local 
government subsidies 
(7%). No federal funding 
for operations. 
Investment budget of 
$4bn p.a. financed by 
MTA Bonds and federal 
government.  
NYC transit (subways 
and buses), MTA Bus 
Company, Long Island 
Railroad, Metro North 
Railroad, bridges, tunnels 
and MTA Capital 
Construction.  
Table 8: Metropolitan Transport Governance in London, Paris and New York 
Sources: Allport et al., (2008) and Authors’ Research 
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The historic funding and financing of London transport demonstrates how the 
state (nationally and locally) and the private sector, at various times, have worked 
to govern and steer transport infrastructure investment in London, using both 
managerial and entrepreneurial practices and mechanisms to fit with political, 
economic and social circumstances of the time. Private sector engagement and 
investment in London’s transport infrastructure has a long history, and can be 
linked to the complex governance of London (Travers 2015). The London 
Underground, for example, was largely built with private capital, and the network 
shaped the growth and geography of London (Wolmar 2002), moreover: 
 
unlike its near contemporaries, the Paris Metro and the New York Subway, 
financed and planned as a whole by the city authorities, the initial Tube 
network, was a product of private company promotions subject to little or 
no central government interference, [and] followed no logical plan (Croome 
and Jackson 1993: 6).  
 
Wolmar (2002) finds it remarkable that private actors led the funding, financing 
and construction of the London Underground: “It is already sufficiently 
incomprehensible to the 21st century mind that a sub-surface railway can be built 
through large sections of London using largely private capital…but it seems even 
more of a miracle that anyone should have embarked on the building of the deep 
tube tunnels on the basis of share capital and consequently the expectation of 
making a profit” (25). Private operators constructed rail lines to support particular 
forms of urban development and to improve local labour market mobility: 
 
The private sector soon recognized the network’s ability to bring suburban 
residents directly to their central city jobs. They set out to both tap existing 
residential areas and create new ones, extending their sub-surface lines 
above ground at the city’s outskirts to serve as of yet undeveloped land. 
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Golders Green, a suburban town of 3,600 homes, shopping parades, and 
recreational facilities planned around Golders Green Tube Station in North 
London, is an early example of the close relationship between transit and 
real estate development (Durst Conference 2013: 3).  
 
By the early 1900s, the financial strain of operating the Underground had become 
intolerable for private operators, who sought greater state intervention in fiscal, 
planning and regulatory terms. Extensions to the Underground before and after 
the First World War had a genuine speculative and entrepreneurial flavour. 
Anticipated uplifts in land values saw stations built in advance of urban 
development projects “enabling London to grow by creating new lines which 
stimulated development” (Wolmar 2002: 223). Private operators wanted the 
managerial, regulatory and fiscal power of the state to be deployed to enable 
greater financial value to be generated and captured from developers, and land and 
property-owners, who were benefitting financially from new transport 
infrastructure, but were paying little towards the cost of investment; a continued 
feature of the UK transport sector (Wolmar 2002). Rebuffed by central 
government, the private sector consolidated its ownership of the Underground but 
continued to push for more active national and local state involvement, and the 
creation of a fully-integrated urban transport system for London.  
 
It was not until the 1930s, that London Transport, as a publicly-owned body 
responsible for the London Underground, was able to issue bonds to raise capital 
to invest in the Underground system. In response to London’s massive transport 
investment requirements, the UK government agreed that a new finance 
corporation could raise up to £45m at the lowest interest rates available under a 
sovereign government guarantee. Wolmar (2002) suggests that this gave borrowing 
flexibility to local actors and also confidence to investors that the national 
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government’s balance sheet would underwrite the debt. Future Underground 
revenues and fare income were securitised against the borrowing. 
 
The post-war years saw a decline in London’s Tube network as London Transport 
was nationalised in 1948, and lost its independence, and there was falling 
investment as the Underground became part of the British Transport Commission 
and had to compete with other public services for government funding (Wolmar 
2002). The absence of a strategic body, speaking exclusively for London, was said 
to be a factor in explaining why the Underground failed to secure new public 
investment (Wolmar 2002). Nationalisation also meant that London Transport 
could no longer raise finance in a similar way to the government-backed 
mechanisms used in the 1930s. Instead, restrictions were placed on investment, 
and national policy focused on re-building the UK’s over-ground railways. In 
response, London Transport switched focus to the cheaper mode of buses, which 
left the Underground starved of resources, resulting in a major backlog of repairs, 
maintenance and investment building up between the 1950s and 1990s (Butcher 
2012). What little investment there was for the Underground was squeezed 
between central government, local government in London and London Transport. 
This scenario persuaded  London Transport to turn towards public private 
partnerships (PPPs) as a means of loosening central government control and 
securing long-term transport infrastructure investment (Wolmar 2002). A legacy of 
urban managerialism and overt centralisation left London with overloaded and 
outdated transport infrastructure. These acute pressures forced local actors to 
adopt more entrepreneurial, speculative and riskier governance and investment 
models in the guise of PPPs.  
 
PPPs gained prominence (and notoriety) during the London Underground Jubilee 
Line Extension (JLE), a project that illustrates how TfL and public and private 
actors have sought to fund and finance transport infrastructure in London. 
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Positive and negative impacts can materialise in equal measure from the 
relationships between new transport infrastructure and particular urban 
development schemes (as was the case in London Docklands and the JLE). The 
challenges posed by the JLE were used by national government to stimulate 
political support for a particular entrepreneurial mode of infrastructure funding 
and financing – in this case transport PPPs – without the value for money and 
operational efficiency of PPPs having been fully evaluated. As mentioned earlier, 
governments in the UK have historically failed to introduce effective regulatory 
mechanisms to capture large-scale land and property value uplift to fund major 
transport infrastructure. In the case of the JLE, land values increased by £2.8bn as 
a direct consequence of the extended Underground line, while property prices in 
Canary Wharf grew by £2bn (Jones et al. 2004). However, no systematic attempt 
was made to capture the uplift in land and property values to fund the JLE and 
thereby reduce taxpayer contributions. To add insult to injury, private developers 
in the Canary Wharf scheme failed to honour original commitments to contribute 
towards the estimated cost of the JLE. The JLE was linked to the Docklands 
development, led by Olympia & York (O&Y) who lobbied the UK government to 
pay towards the cost of substantial new transport infrastructure, and who 
themselves also promised to contribute funding. The final cost of the JLE was 
£3.5bn: financed by a £2.2bn central government grant and £1.3bn from London 
Underground’s investment programme. O&Y promised £0.4bn, to be paid over 24 
years. However, the developers went into administration in the mid-1990s and by 
2000 O&Y had contributed £0.15bn and was offering a final payment of £0.05bn, 
meaning their total contribution was 50 per cent of what had been promised 
initially. The figure represented 6 per cent of the final bill for the JLE. Wolmar 
(2002) suggests that the JLE project gave successive UK governments licence to 
push for privatised funding and financing models in the form of PPPs in response 
to what the government saw as publically-owned London Underground’s failure to 
manage and control JLE construction costs.  
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By the late 1990s, the London Underground desparately needed new investment. 
Falling fare income had reduced revenues, and the repairs and maintenance 
backlog was estimated to be £1.2 billion (Butcher 2012). While the Conservative 
Government (1992-97) had announced its intention to privatise the Underground, 
the new Labour Government, in 1997, opted for a PPP, but faced stiff opposition 
from the incoming (independent) Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone and his 
Transport Commissioner, Bob Kiley (former head of the New York MTA), who 
championed a model used previously in London: bond issuance secured against 
future fare revenues. However, the proposal was firmly rejected by the UK 
Treasury, which had been instructed by the Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, to 
stick steadfastly to the previous Conservative government’s tax and spending plans 
and who was unwilling to provide any fiscal licence to the new independent 
London Mayor. Business, via London First, pushed for the creation of a London 
Transport Trust, a public interest company, with a clearly defined legal structure, 
which could borrow directly from the financial markets. The revenues for servicing 
the debt would be generated by hypothecated taxes, and the model would see 
central government relaxing the rules on public sector borrowing (Butcher 2012). 
The Treasury, however, rejected the alternative mechanisms, and the PPP went 
ahead in 2003, with one bidder suggesting that London Underground reluctantly 
supported the PPP model as it was the only practical means it had of guaranteeing 
long-term government funding (Butcher 2012).  
 
The PPP saw LU infrastructure assets maintained by private companies but 
ownership and operations remaining with LU. Tube Lines, a private entity, was 
awarded a 30-year contract for the Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly lines. Shortly 
after the start of the contract, the PPP encountered financial problems and 
London Underground was asked by Tube Lines to bring forward a £5.75bn 
payment. The PPP arbiter rejected the request and proposed a £4.4bn payment 
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instead. Plagued by ongoing financial and management problems, the Tube Lines 
PPP collapsed in 2010, resulting in TfL buying out the private companies within 
the consortia. Metronet, another private sector operator, collapsed in 2007 when it 
failed to secure bank lending facilities, and was unable to obtain further payments 
from London Underground. The UK government eventually had to pay £1.7bn to 
cover 95 per cent of the public sector debt guarantee written into the PPP 
contract, as well as an additional £300m in administration costs.  
 
While the London Underground PPP failed, the exercise nevertheless is said to 
have helped TfL make the case to government for long-term transport 
infrastructure investment in London.4 In an illustration of the UK’s highly-
centralised state, the PPP revealed the tensions between national, devolved and 
local governments, at a time when London’s fledgling governance institutions were 
still in their infancy. National government introduced a regulatory regime in which 
the new devolved London institutions – led by a Mayor opposed politically by the 
then Prime Minister and Labour government – was forced to work within, 
providing further illustration of the historic, centralist and interventionist role 
played by national government in the governance of the London global city-region.   
 
The nature of UK inter-governmental relations, coupled with London’s limited 
devolved settlement, means that the Mayor and TfL have to prepare individual 
business cases to secure central government funding for major transport 
infrastructure schemes in London. The GLA Act stipulates that the GLA, on 
behalf of TfL, receives grant funding from national government annually, and that 
the Mayor cannot spend the grant on anything other than transport (Tomaney 
2001). TfL has argued for multi-year settlements to help with long-term investment 
planning, and for greater borrowing powers. TfL and the GLA account for over 16 
per cent (£11.2bn) of total local authority borrowing in England (£52.2bn) (HMT 
                                                          
4 According to Sir Peter Hendy, former TfL Commissioner, in a lecture at the University of Leeds in July 2015.  
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2015). In 2015, the UK government announced that it would ultimately withdraw 
TfL’s operational grant, indicating that the grant reduction would “save £700m in 
2019-20, which could be achieved through further efficiency savings by TfL, or 
through generating additional income from the 5,700 acres of land TfL owns in 
London” (HM Treasury 2015: 95), pushing the case for greater urban 
entrepreneurialism but also a requirement for the state to plan and deploy 
managerially a new set of investment instruments, including value capture to 
support transport infrastructure funding and financing. 
 
From 2019, TfL’s objective is to cover operational costs through ‘non-grant’ 
income, and to accelerate an internal efficiency programme, as total grant income is 
set to fall by £2.8bn. This scenario is compelling TfL to consider alternative 
funding and financing mechanisms, some highly-speculative and entrepreneurial in 
nature, to increase revenues, while freezing fares, which Mayor Johnson and his 
successor, Sadiq Khan, both pledged to do, but which TfL officials suggest will be 
problematic for the business ‘bottom line’: 
 
We have a £16bn efficiency programme that has been running since 2009. 
With less funding we have the mechanics and the maturity to deal with this. 
We have made a huge £16bn set of assumptions. In reality, in order to 
balance the budget, we will also look at fares. We have to look at things we 
may need to stop and what services we are offering (TfL official, Authors’ 
Interview, 2015). 
 
At the same time, TfL faces acute challenges in its private sector-led Sub-surface 
UPpgrade Programme (SUP) designed to increase capacity on the London 
Underground’s District, Circle, Metropolitan and Hammersmith and City lines 
(TfL 2014). Completing the SUP by 2018 was a key condition of central 
government providing TfL with a capital grant of £1bn a year until 2020-21 
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(London Assembly 2015). In June 2011, TfL awarded a signal replacement contract 
to Bombardier Transportation, with a target price of £354m. However, the work 
was severely delayed and TfL ended the contract in December 2013, paying the 
private contractor £85m in a final settlement. Following a new procurement 
exercise, TfL awarded the contract to Thales. According to the London Assembly 
(2016), the signalling element of the SUP is expected to cost £886m more than 
originally planned and completion will be five years late (2023 instead of 2018). 
TfL expects the programme to cost £5.4bn – an increase of £1.15bn –  which it 
will have to find from its own resources, while£1.3bn in planned extra fare revenue 
will also be foregone, illustrating both entrepreneurial and managerialist failures in 
the planning, funding and delivery of transport infrastructure investment:  
 
They [TfL] are a very, very long way from meeting the milestone deadline 
that we set them a few years ago, and they ran into all sorts of problems 
with their signalling contract. They had let a contract to Bombardier to re-
signal those four lines and it became clear a year into the contact that 
Bombardier frankly weren’t going to be able to do it, Bombardier promised 
more than they could actually deliver, so TfL ended up having to buy 
Bombardier out of the contract and they’ve kind of had to go back to the 
drawing board really in working out what’s possible (Department for 
Transport Official, Authors’ Interview 2015).    
 
These examples indicate how transport infrastructure projects fail for different 
reasons and are used as arguments against TfL’s case for the London global city-
region to be given more financial freedom from UK government to plan, invest in 
and manage transport infrastructure. Equally, these experiences also undermine 
claims that the private sector should automatically be afforded a greater role in 
transport infrastructure renewal and maintenance. Attempts to improve the 
governance of transport infrastructure funding and financing are bedevilled by 
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iinfrastructure overload, built-up through increased population, demands on 
services and years of chronic under-investment, inefficient and ineffective planning 
and project management by the state, in regulatory and financial terms, coupled 
with greater demands for improved accountability, operational performance, and 
the need to shift towards greater sharing by private interests of the captured 
proceeds of financial uplift and value as a result of public investment. The 
following case studies demonstrate how TfL and public and private partners – at 
international, national and local levels – are using, amidst financial, political and 
economic constraints, a hybrid mix of managerialist and entrepreneurial funding 
and financing mechanisms, on a project-by-project basis, to govern, plan, invest in, 
maintain and operate transport infrastructure in the London global city-region. 
Projects are based on particular, often bespoke, models of governance and funding 
and financing, which attempt to knit together coalitions of public and private 
actors, intersecting at particular scales and temporal junctures with local 
commercial and residential property markets, and which shape the condition of the 
urban and sub-urban built environment in the London global city-region. 
 
5.3.1 Northern Line Extension 
 
The 3.3km Northern Line Extension (NLE) is a major feature of the 
redevelopment of the ‘Vauxhall, Nine Elms, Battersea Opportunity Area’; a new 
employment and residential district located on the edge of central London. TfL is 
extending the existing London Underground Northern Line to Nine Elms and 
Battersea, and two new stations will open by 2020. The development is part of the 
Mayor’s London Plan, London Transport Strategy and the London Infrastructure 
Investment Plan. The NLE is estimated to cost £1.04bn. In November 2012, the 
UK Treasury agreed that up to £1bn of Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) 
borrowing, supported by a public sector guarantee (totalling £750m) under the UK 
Guarantee Scheme, would be offered to the GLA, on behalf of TfL. In November 
2011, the Government said it would consider designating an Enterprise Zone (EZ) 
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allowing the local retention of growth in business rates for 25 years. The offer was 
subject to a binding agreement being reached with a developer by the end of 2013, 
and further due diligence on project costs. HHowever, in a bi-lateral deal with the 
UK government, the GLA and TfL were able to source cheaper finance than that 
offered by the PWLB through a £480m long-term loan from the EIB. In this deal, 
£200m of finance is also being drawn from an index-linked bond issuance, and the 
remaining £300m of capital is being raised from developers. The GLA will repay 
the project financing costs using developer contributions collected by Wandsworth 
and Lambeth Boroughs. Business rate income above a defined baseline in the new 
EZ will be retained by the Boroughs and the GLA. Once the NLE is operational, 
fare revenues will pay the operational costs of the extension as part of a bespoke 
funding and financing model (Figure 10).  
 
The development is a major ‘test case’ for the UK government’s EZ policy and the 
developer-contribution model of infrastructure financing. When viewed in a 
national context, these mechanisms have more chance of succeeding in London 
with its buoyant commercial and residential property markets than in most other 
UK cities and city-regions. However, foregoing local taxation in a successful urban 
economy and property market environment raises critical questions about potential 
economic deadweight – publicly subsidising a development that would have 
occurred anyway. Commercial and property developers, both private and state-led, 
have a keen interest in the NLE, given its potential for significant rates of return 
for real estate investors. The developers are majority-owned by the Malaysian 
Government through a Sovereign Wealth Fund.  
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Figure 10: Funding and financing model for the Northern Line Extension 
Source: Adapted from TfL (2013) 
 
The NLE is seen by the UK government as a model of how TfL should embrace 
entrepreneurial funding and financing mechanisms, such as property-led 
development, to support investment in transport infrastructure: “we are 
encouraging TfL to think very innovatively about how future bits of transport 
infrastructure might be funded and the Northern Line Extension is probably the 
best example” (DfT Official, Authors’ Interview, 2016). However, there are 
concerns that the NLE is more about “developing finance than financing 
development” (Hildyard 2012: 1) and an illustration of the reach and extension of 
financialised real estate development predicated upon the need to achieve high 
levels of densification and rates of return: “The Northern Line extension is a good 
infrastructure project, but the justification and levels of density to pay for it are 
questionable. It is based on a TIF scheme and business rates. The project needs 
high levels of density to pay for itself” (GLA Official, Authors’ Interview, 2015).    
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In terms of ungovernability and infrastructure investment in a global city-region, 
TfL, the GLA and two London Boroughs are subject to statutory requirements as 
local government institutions, and must to adhere to the Local Government 
Prudential Borrowing Code. HM Treasury, DfT, EIB, bond markets and credit 
rating agencies have an interest in ‘monitoring’ project delivery and performance of 
the NLE, especially Treasury, given the public loan guarantee. The EIB, which is 
providing the majority of the finance, has long played an active project 
management role in urban infrastructure and development, so will be involved at 
most stages of construction. Other state and private sector interests, principally 
developers, will be engaged in the governance of the NLE scheme.  
 
Bringing this complex array of different public and private sector actors together in 
a coherent and cohesive governance framework is a difficult process. It represents 
a product of the search by the state and private interests in the London global city-
region for new means of investment in transport infrastructure against a 
background of national austerity and limited fiscal decentralisation, mixing 
entrepreneurial and managerial practices and governance forms. It is also a 
reflection of London’s continued dominant ‘national champion’ role within the 
UK political economy, and divergence with other UK cities and city-regions, as the 
national government is more willing to sanction innovative and relatively risky 
investment arrangements in London than elsewhere.  
 
5.3.2 Crossrail 
 
Crossrail – Europe’s largest infrastructure project – is a new rail line, including 26 
miles of tunnel running from Reading and Heathrow Airport to the west of 
London, through central London and into Essex. Crossrail Limited, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of TfL, is delivering the programme, with Network Rail 
improving existing surface infrastructure. In 2007, DfT and TfL agreed to make 
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£15.9bn of funding available for Crossrail. By 2009, the estimated cost of the 
programme had increased to £17.8 billion, and Crossrail Limited initiated an 
assessment to reduce project costs and risks. In May 2010, with a new government 
committed to fiscal consolidation, project costs were revised downwards to £14.8 
billion (NAO 2014). Additional costs, including £1bn for new rolling stock, will be 
funded directly by TfL. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the £14.8bn of funding.  
 
 
Source Total Source Total 
TfL direct 
contribution 
£1,900m DfT direct 
contribution 
£4,800m 
Private sector 
funding (TfL 
responsibility) 
- BRS 
(£4,100m) 
- Sale of 
surplus land 
and property 
(£500m) 
- CIL (£300m) 
- Developer 
contributions 
(£300m) 
£5,200m Private sector 
funding (DfT 
responsibility) 
- City of 
London 
(£250m) 
- Heathrow 
Airport 
(£230m)  
 
£480m 
Network Rail  £2,300m Voluntary 
contributions from 
London business  
£100m 
Table 9: Funding Crossrail 
Source: NAO (2014a) 
 
The Business Rate Supplement (BRS) – a hypothecated tax collected over 30 years 
– which the London Boroughs will collect on behalf of the GLA and TfL – began 
in 2010, and will raise £4.1bn from commercial buildings worth more than 
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£55,000 in rateable value. TfL officials were surprised at the straightforward 
operation of the BRS:  
 
the borrowing has all been done, the extra money that came in the early 
construction period has come in as expected, and of the total of £4.1bn to 
be put into the project, everything has gone in except, I think, £9m, which is 
earmarked for the end of 31 March 2016. And there’s been very little 
complaint, which always strikes me as a highly successful policy” (TfL 
official, Authors’ Interview, 2015). 
 
London First played an important role in ‘encouraging’ business to support the 
BRS: “The BRS was seen by us and by the business community in London as a 
good investment and one that should be supported, and we strongly supported it” 
(London First official, Authors’ Interview, 2015). In an illustration of London’s 
distinct nature, and the preferential treatment that London continues to receive in 
relation to infrastructure investment, the 2009 Business Rate Supplement Act 
exempted the GLA from a requirement to ballot or hold a referendum of business 
on introducing a BRS before 1 April 2011 (GLA 2010). Without this legal 
exemption, London’s private sector may not have voted to increase business rate 
contributions, thus leaving Crossrail with a £4.1bn hole in its budget.  
 
In terms of financing, the “basic principle of Crossrail 1’s financing structure has 
been that the entity which receives funds is also the entity which raises finance” 
(PwC 2014: 33), with TfL and GLA both borrowing from the EIB and PWLB, and 
the GLA providing £0.6bn of bond finance on behalf of TfL. Other finance is 
provided by central government, Network Rail’s regulated asset-base model, the 
private sector and the City of London (Table 10). Sovereign wealth funds, and 
infrastructure and pension funds, have not financed Crossrail and are reluctant to 
finance in their entirety Crossrail 2 and other large transport projects because of 
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potential construction risks. Instead, direct government, state-backed guarantees 
are being sought, due to the size and complexity of such projects (PwC 2014).  
 
One criticism of the Crossrail funding model is that more monetary value could 
have been captured from land and property owners who have benefited financially 
from the infrastructure development (PwC 2014). Since the Crossrail project 
began, property prices proximate to stations on the Crossrail link have increased 
on average by 20 per cent (CBRE 2013). However, as noted in the development 
and expansion of the London Underground, the UK state has struggled to 
introduce mechanisms that capture value uplift (Wolmar 2002):  
 
what we didn’t realise was that Crossrail appears to be putting property 
prices in Ealing up by twenty five percent for residential property. Where 
there is new build, the Mayor’s CILCommunity Infrastructure Levy means 
that we will take some of that, but existing residential property is not going 
to be contributing anything (TfL official, Authors’ Interview, 2015).  
 
This illustrates the political challenge of increasing property-based taxation, and the 
constraints on widening and deepening particular managerialist and entrepreneurial 
approaches to funding and financing urban infrastructure.  
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Responsible 
organisation 
Funding 
source 
Total 
Finance 
Raised 
% of Total 
Funding 
Source 
TfL Crossrail 
Revenue 
£1.9bn 12.9% £1.0bn EIB loan 
£0.9bn PWLB loan 
GLA Business Rate 
Supplement 
£4.1bn 27.7% £3.5bn PWLB loan 
£0.6bn bond issue as 
a direct contribution 
to TfL 
DfT Department 
Capital Budget 
£4.96bn 33.6% Central government 
grant 
Network Rail 
Track Access 
Charges 
£2.3bn 15.6% Financed through 
Network Rail’s 
Regulatory Asset 
Base (RAB) 
Private 
Contributions 
£0.6bn 4.9% Negotiated 
agreements with 
private companies, 
and the City of 
London 
Table 10: Financing Crossrail 
Source: PwC (2014) 
 
 
5.3.3 Crossrail 2 
 
Crossrail 2 is framed within the context of the London Plan’s ‘Opportunity Areas’ 
(London First 2015), and is designed to enable an extra 270,000 people at peak 
times to access central London from different parts of the city-region. The project 
is intended to integrate real estate and transport infrastructure by opening up new 
spaces for residential development (NIC 2016): “Crossrail 1 is very different to 
Crossrail 2. Crossrail 2 is about housing development in outer London. Central 
London has money but no land. Elsewhere has land but no money” (London 
Borough official, Authors’ Interview, 2015).   
 
TfL estimates that Crossrail 2 will cost between £27bn and £32bn (with a 66 per 
cent optimism bias included), including the cost of new trains and Network Rail 
infrastructure works. A London Chamber of Commerce poll found that 44 per 
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cent of business members regarded Crossrail 2 as the main transport priority for 
London (LCC 2015). The cost of Crossrail 2 is nearly twice the annual capital 
investment budget for London (£15bn), and will cost approximately £376m for 
every mile of the 85 miles of proposed new rail line. The UK government has 
indicated that at least 50 per cent of the funding should come from private 
investment, which some business organisations believe is feasible (London First 
2014). However, a premium will be placed on the GLA and TfL identifying 
efficiency savings given that business has cited the high cost of transport schemes 
in London as a barrier to effective planning, investment and operation of 
infrastructure. In addition, Crossrail 2 poses profound questions about the 
implications for other cities and city-regions in the UK and spatial rebalancing due 
to the concentration of public and private infrastructural resources in London. 
London has received significant investment recently for new transport 
infrastructure (e.g. Crossrail and NLE) and political pressure is increasing for the 
UK government to invest more public resources in transport infrastructure outside 
of London, especially in the north of England (Transport for the North 2016). In 
2014, a ‘Funding and Financing Feasibility Study’ recommended that the hybrid 
funding and financing model used for Crossrail was the most appropriate for 
Crossrail 2 (PwC 2014). 
 
Like Crossrail, the Crossrail 2 route extends beyond the GLA boundary and into 
the broader city-region (Figure 11). This requires careful governance and planning, 
involving multiple local units of governance, within the context of no statutory 
strategic planning framework for the functional economic area. Representatives of 
local authorities from London, the south east and east of England have calle on the 
National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) and government to ensure that 
Crossrail 2 is built (Ames 2016). The NIC believes that the benefits from Crossrail 
2 will be felt equally within the London global city-region, and that consideration 
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should be given as to how south east local governments, as well as the GLA and 
London Boroughs, fund the costs of the project.  
 
In March 2016, the NIC recommended that government should take forward 
Crossrail 2, and funding should be made available to develop the scheme, with the 
aim of a hybrid legislative Bill being submitted to Parliament by late 2019, meaning 
that Crossrail 2 would open in 2033. In March 2016, the government agreed to 
contribute £80m towards further development work (HM Treasury 2016a). The 
NIC report on Crossrail 2 (NIC 2016) outlines four next steps to move the scheme 
forward: first, sponsors should produce proposals to increase the affordability of 
the project; second, a strategy should be developed to ensure that Crossrail 2 
‘unlocks’ housing growth; third, a funding plan should identify how and where 
London will contribute towards the costs of the project; and fourth, private sector 
development and funding of new stations and surrounding local areas should be 
maximised. The NIC calls for a ‘London deal for Crossrail 2’ where the 
government contributes financially to the cost of the project and in return the 
Mayor and Boroughs give commitments to build new housing. The Commission 
also recommends further fiscal autonomy so that London can raise new tax 
revenues and hypothecate them to invest in the project. London, according to the 
NIC, should also be incentivised to receive additional government funding for 
Crossrail 2 in return for increased GVA and property values – akin to a ‘City Deal’ 
for London based on the Greater Cambridge ‘gain-share’ infrastructure investment 
model (O’Brien and Pike 2015). In its response to the NIC report, the UK 
government agreed that Crossrail 2 should be taken forward as a priority as the 
scheme is ‘central’ to London’s long-term investment plans. The government 
proposes that London should fund more than half the cost of the project, and that 
new funding from locally-raised tax revenues should be considered. The 
government also wants to reduce the total cost by £4bn (HM Treasury 2016a). 
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Figure 11: Proposed route of Crossrail 2 
Source: Temple Group 
 
Crossrail 2 illustrates how national and local state actors in the London global city-
region are deploying a hybrid mix of managerial and entrepreneurial funding and 
financing mechanisms to generate and leverage public and private investment into 
major transport infrastructure. Here, a nexus is being formed between residential 
housing development and transport infrastructure. Crossrail 2 also demonstrates 
the practical challenges of governance and ungovernability within and across the 
London city-region given the multiple actors involved in planning, funding, 
financing and constructing the project.  
 
5.3.4 Metropolitan Line Extension 
 
TfL is also involved in relatively smaller transport infrastructure renewal projects 
involving different actors and institutions within and outside the GLA boundary. 
The case study of the London Underground’s Metropolitan Line Extension (MLE) 
illustrates further the uneven institutional capacity, capability and resources that 
exist between TfL, as part of the GLA governance arrangements, and local 
authorities and LEPs, which although part of the London global city-region, are 
outside the GLA formal administrative area. The MLE – a 3.4 mile rail link – 
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extends into Hertfordshire County Council (HCC), and is due to be completed by 
the end of 2020 (DfT/Mayor of London 2016). The MLE aims to increase 
capacity on the London Underground, and connect the Underground to the West 
Coast Mainline railway via Network Rail’s Watford Junction station (TfL 2015). 
London dominates the economic activity and commuting patterns within south 
Hertfordshire, where there are strong labour market linkages with the capital and 
many high-income commuters to London live.  
 
In 2011, DfT gave provisional approval for a £76.2m central government grant 
towards a scheme estimated to cost £116m. The initial funding package envisaged 
no direct TfL financial contribution. However, since 2011, HCC, has faced major 
reductions in grant funding from central government. Coupled with cost 
escalations and programme slippages, DfT recommended that project delivery 
responsibility be transferred from HCC to TfL. TfL commissioned due diligence, 
which concluded that the cost of delivering the project had risen to £284.4m, a 
figure that formed the basis of a new funding package agreed in March 2015 by the 
Mayor of London, central government and local actors. The funding comprised 
£49.2m from TfL, £125.4m of local contributions (including £87.9m of Growth 
Deal funding from Hertfordshire LEP – which represents over 40 per cent of the 
LEP’s total Growth Deal resources) and £109.8m from DfT. TfL secured a deal 
with HM Treasury for a £30.5m increase in TfL’s prudential borrowing limit (TfL 
would retain future fare revenues to service debt and pay back the capital sum) and 
TfL contributed £16m from its Growth Fund (London Assembly 2015). Once 
agreement was reached on the new arrangements, the Mayor of London directed 
TfL to assume full responsibility for the MLE in March 2015.  
 
TfL has taken the lead for a strategic transport infrastructure project located 
primarily outside London’s administrative geography. HCC officials have indicated 
that the local authority should adopt a similar approach as London in the funding, 
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financing and planning of transport infrastructure: “All south east local authorities 
need to do long-term planning. We need to plan our infrastructure and copy 
London” (Hertfordshire County Council official, Authors’ Interview, 15 May 
2015). It is unlikely, however, that individual local authorities would have the 
capacity and resources to perform a similar role to that of TfL. This case illustrates 
how national and local state actors have employed managerialist approaches to 
funding and financing transport infrastructure, and adopted particular governance 
models to fit specific geographies and project objectives. The case also provides a 
further example of London’s ability to re-cast national-local state relations and 
strike financial and regulatory deals with national government when necessary; in 
this case new financial flexibilities for TfL, and how some of the inherent 
challenges surrounding the governance of infrastructure investment in the London 
global city-region are managed in bespoke ways on a project-by-project basis.  
 
 
5.3.5 TfL’s transformation into a property development agency? 
 
 
One of the things we need to do is increase the revenue streams from TfL. 
We should be sweating the assets better. Hong Kong’s transport network 
raises more money by clever use of property than from fares, and London 
should follow the same model (Sadiq Khan MP, then Labour candidate for 
the Mayor of London, in a speech to London business, 9 March 2016).  
 
With a 5,700 acre property portfolio, TfL is one of the largest land and property 
owners in London. In 2012, TfL revised its strategy of uniform disposal of ‘non-
essential’ property and land assets towards a new approach where sites are 
developed jointly with the private sector to generate long-term revenue streams 
(TfL 2014a). TfL owns 500 ‘commercially-viable’ sites across London and has 
short-listed 75 for development in the next 10 years to generate £1.1bn of non-fare 
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income by 2022/23 as part of a broader effort to raise £4.2bn through commercial 
development activity. The plans are being accelerated given the reductions in 
central government grant funding and the political constraints TfL faces in 
increasing fares: 
 
We’ve strongly encouraged TfL to get more savvy in the way it generates 
income from its estate, for example, so it’s got a very ambitious commercial 
development programme now, which covers everything from, you know, 
the sponsorship deals for Santander cycles to advertising at tube stations, to 
flogging off the old headquarters at 55 Broadway, which is all going to be 
turned into luxury homes (DfT official, Authors’ Interview, 2015). 
 
In February 2016, TfL announced that it had appointed 13 property development 
companies and consortiums in a new development framework tasked with bringing 
forward development on 50 sites on the TfL estate (TfL 2016). The firms will have 
preferential bidding rights for work from TfL or will work in joint ventures in 
which TfL either sells land at market value and receive an immediate return or 
acquires an equity stake and take a share of future receipts.  
 
TfL is actively engaged in one joint venture – the Earl’s Court development 
scheme – with Earls Court Partnership Ltd, an arm of Capital and Counties 
Properties (Capco), one of the largest listed property companies in London that 
manages £3.7bn of real estate assets (Capco 2015). The Earls Court redevelopment 
is said to be worth £8bn, with Capco having a 63 per cent controlling interest and 
TfL the remaining 37 per cent stake. Capco is the leaseholder and London 
Underground (on behalf of TfL) the freeholder. The scheme has plans for 7,500 
new homes, 1.5m square feet of retail and office space on the site of the Earl’s 
Court Exhibition Centre, adjacent to a new transport depot. Outlining the rationale 
for the joint venture, TfL stated that: 
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[P]arties will be able to merge their respective land interests into a single 
vehicle to promote development, thereby allowing both parties to 
participate in the development in a flexible way and share both the risks and 
the rewards. London Underground would not be able to derive this benefit 
at this time without joining with Capco. The anticipated returns that TfL 
makes on its investment over time will be available for reinvestment into the 
transport system in accordance with the TfL Business Plan (2014b: 1). 
 
The joint venture has proved controversial (Hill 2015; 2016). Agreements between 
Hammersmith and Fulham Borough and the joint venture required the developer 
to fund ‘community benefits’, worth £452m, which enabled outline planning 
consent for the main part of the redevelopment to be granted. Out of the £452m, 
£315m is for 1,500 new ‘affordable’ homes. Capco and TfL expect to sell 6,000 
housing units on the market, in addition to 1,500 affordable homes based on 
London prices (i.e. 80 per cent of local commercial market rates). No new 
properties will be available for social rent, despite social housing being the most 
affordable tenure. In addition, 760 of the 1,500 new homes are replacements for 
houses refurbished recently by the public sector, but which are set to be 
demolished. So-called ‘collateral agreements’ written into the Earls Court scheme, 
at the request of the developer, oblige local planning authorities to reject any 
challenges to the project (Hill 2015).  
 
In response to the increasingly entrepreneurial terrain it is moving into, TfL has 
established a Commercial Development Advisory Group to oversee its property 
development strategy. TfL has also sought national regulatory changes to 
strengthen its foothold in real estate development. The ‘Transport for London Act 
2016’ has given TfL new financial powers in relation to land and property, allowing 
TfL to form limited liability partnerships (LLPs) with different actors, including 
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offshore vehicles. Controversially, limited liability partnerships are not required to 
publish annual accounts, which could hamper scrutiny of TfL and the London 
Transport Strategy by the London Assembly, which has sometimes found it 
difficult to obtain data on TfL’s commercial deals and contracts.  
 
TfL’s engagement with the London property market to raise funding and financing 
for transport infrastructure is predicated on entrepreneurial and speculative 
investment mechanisms that are dependent upon the financial appreciation of 
assets. While the returns, particularly in some parts of the city-region, have been 
and could continue to be substantial, there are also inherent risks in using property 
markets as a major source of institutional capital and revenue. Buyer appetite for 
‘luxury’ London properties, which has increased during the past decade, is now 
said to be reducing (Evans 2016). JLL, a US-based property developer, predicted 
that the prices for new-build high-value homes in central London would fall 3 per 
cent in 2016, and not rise again until 2018. The London market is said to be 
shrinking due to a combination of over supply and falling demand, and shares in 
Capco – the Earl’s Court developer – fell 8 per cent after the company revealed 
that the sales of luxury apartments in west London had not risen in value since 
November 2015. Analysis in the aftermath of the EU referendum vote and new tax 
changes suggested that London’s high-end property market had seen prices fall by 
6.9 per cent (Davies 2017). Volatile market conditions, fuelled by external shocks, 
are sowing doubts about TfL’s capacity and capability to widen and deepen its 
involvement in property development, with one London Borough official stating 
that “TfL should not be in the development game at all” (Authors’ Interview, 
2015). Others have expressed similar sentiments: 
 
[TfL] will of course need to manage its estate properly. It has not always 
done that well in the past, and I doubt the capability and competence of 
transport organisations – even though many very good people work for 
 92 
 
them – to deal with some of the most rapacious and greedy property 
developers in London. Somehow the public sector also seems to come off 
worse when it enters into such deals (Andy Slaughter, Labour MP for 
Hammersmith, speaking in a Westminster Hall debate on ‘Transport for 
London Funding’, 15 December 2015).  
 
In a further illustration of TfL’s entrepreneurial use of urban land and property 
assets, TfL signed the ‘world’s largest outdoor advertising contract’ in 2016 (TfL 
2016a) to sell advertising space on trains and London Underground stations in the 
expectation of generating £1.1bn in revenue. This builds on the first station 
sponsorship deal for the Underground when, in April 2015, TfL sold the rights to 
Nestlé for Canada Water station to be renamed for 24 hours as ‘Buxton Water’ 
(Farrell 2015). In 2012, transport authorities in Madrid agreed to sell sponsorship 
rights to the city’s metro stations (Milmo 2012). 
 
TfL’s use of land and property assets, in an entrepreneurial and financialised 
manner, represent an attempt to generate new income to invest in transport 
infrastructure and services, and comes against a background of austerity and fiscal 
decentralisation, and price appreciation in London’s residential and commercial 
real estate markets. TfL is seeking to extract greater financial value from its land 
and property asset holdings to meet growing demands on services and address 
infrastructure overload, and to exploit London’s distinct position as a major global 
city-region and magnet for international capital. As a model, using income from 
property development to fund transport infrastructure is highly speculative, 
dependent to a large degree on direct state ownership of land and property, and is 
reliant upon planning and regulatory processes that facilitate high density levels. In 
Hong Kong, for example, the transport authority, MTR, has pioneered an 
integrated rail and property infrastructure funding and financing model. However, 
it is a distinct mechanism that reflects the specific governance, planning, market 
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and geographical environment in Hong Kong. Transport infrastructure investment, 
although shaped by, and an influencer of, processes of financialisation, is also 
framed by the specific urban built environment and governance and regulatory 
regimes of individual global city-regions.  
 
5.3.6 Devolution of suburban rail services  
 
As London’s economy and population have grown, journeys on rail-based 
transport in and around the city-region have doubled over the last 20 years (Figure 
12). Faced with passenger growth, pressures on transport infrastructure, and 
demands for new investment, TfL and recent Mayors have lobbyed UK 
government greater control over national and regional rail services. In the first half 
of 2016, the DfT consulted on rail devolution to London and the Greater South 
East (DfT/Mayor of London 2016), while Mayor Khan was invited in autumn 
2016 by the DfT Secretary of State, Chris Grayling, to submit a business case to 
government setting out the case for rail devolution to TfL.  
 
 
Figure 12: London regional rail passenger journeys (thousands) to/from/within region 
Source: ORR (2016) 
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TfL has been seeking a new contract model of commissioning, similar to the rail 
services operating on the London Overground network. Under the new proposals, 
services operating under the Southern, South West Trains and Southeastern 
franchises would be devolved to TfL. Suggestions that the London Overground 
has been ‘transformed’ since TfL took control in 2007 (Centre for London 2016), 
coupled with growing dissatisfaction at the performance of suburban rail services 
in south London, has given further weight to the case for greater devolution of 
nationally-franchised rail services elsewhere in the London global city-region 
(London Assembly 2015a): 
 
We are looking to apply TfL operational experiences to suburban rail 
services. In some examples, we have seen dramatic transport improvements 
to franchises. We have a strong case for taking control of some franchises. 
We are also looking for a stronger strategic role in planning alongside 
Network Rail (TfL official, Authors’ Interview, 3 November 2015). 
 
A different regulatory model operates in London compared to elsewhere in 
England. London’s devolved governance system influences how the ‘state’ 
commissions the private sector to operate local rail services in London, and differs 
from the DfT national franchise model (Table 11). Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and the north of England are seeking to move away from the franchise 
model and shift towards a more ‘direct control’ mechanism. In the concession 
model, TfL, because of its institutional capacity and autonomy, can absorb and 
retain revenue risk. It can also integrate local rail services with the Underground. 
The DfT franchise model puts a higher risk premium on the private operator, who 
is dependent on revenues to break even. If revenues decline then the operator has 
to take a financial hit and has less incentive or resources to invest in the network. 
In the concession model, TfL pays the operator a fee to run the service and offers 
incentives for improved performance. Passenger satisfaction levels play an 
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important role in determining the choice of operator; a ‘metric’ that DfT wants to 
adopt within the franchise model, as part of its move away from narrow price-
based calculations. In the concession model, because all ticket revenue is retained 
by TfL, fare income can be used to (re)invest in the network. 
 
 
Model 
 
Scale Risk Value 
TfL ‘Concession’ – 
operator is awarded a 
contract to run a 
‘tightly-specified’ 
service on behalf of 
TfL. TfL leases or 
buys trains, and TfL 
branding appears on 
the service.  
City and city-region 
level (e.g. London 
Overground) – 
Mayor of London 
Risk lies mainly with 
TfL who pays a fee 
to the operator to run 
the service for a fixed 
term. All revenues are 
retained by TfL. 
Incentive payments 
encourage the 
operator to improve 
performance.  
Service-driven model. 
Strong integration 
between a concession 
service, the Mayor’s 
economic and 
transport strategies 
and the wider urban 
transport system 
managed by TfL.  
DfT ‘Franchise’ – 
operator runs a 
contracted service on 
a particular part of 
the rail network 
under licence from 
UK Government and 
national regulator. 
Operator leases or 
buys trains and uses 
its own branding.  
National, pan-
regional and regional 
(e.g. West/East Coast 
Mainline, Northern 
Rail) – UK 
Government 
Possibility of greater 
profit for operator, 
who retains revenues, 
but faces greater risk 
as income needed to 
break-even and pay 
government 
(premiums), train 
leasing charges and 
track access charges. 
Cost-driven model. 
Company chosen on 
basis of ‘best value 
for money’. Operator 
paid fee/subsidy to 
run service for DfT. 
Rail infrastructure 
owned by Network 
Rail.  
Table 11: TfL concession model v DfT franchise model 
Source: Authors’ Research 
 
Owing to the piecemeal way in which the London global city-region and its 
transport network have developed, south London is more reliant upon UK 
National Rail services than other parts of London. The joint DfT/Mayor of 
London devolution consultation prospectus (2016) suggested that a South London 
metro service should be created with more frequent services and stops, and 
outlined a mechanism for how local authorities within and outside the GLA 
boundary could influence services planned jointly by DfT and TfL. Proposals 
include the transfer of responsibility to TfL for inner suburban rail services 
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operating mostly or wholly within the GLA geography, but significantly the 
prospectus recognises that the Mayor and TfL will need to work with local 
authorities and other institutions across the wider city-region: 
 
With the region’s railways under more pressure than ever, we can’t afford to 
focus only on the needs of London or the South East individually, ignoring 
the reality that the economy of the region as a whole has to work together 
(DfT/Mayor of London 2016: 9).  
 
National, sub-national and local governments play a significant role in managing 
rail services in other global city-regions, such as Tokyo, New York and Berlin 
(London Assembly 2015a). Mindful of the challenge of building and maintaining 
multi and cross-institutional mechanisms for governing transport infrastructure, 
and reflecting national government’s historic involvement in the governance of 
London’s strategic transport, DfT and TfL advocated a new relationship between 
national government, London and local actors: 
 
The precise boundaries [of inner and outer London suburban services] will 
take time to agree, but we want to start those discussions as soon as we can, 
and in good time for transfer of South Eastern inner suburban services 
when the current franchise ends. Working with local authorities and other 
stakeholders we will agree clear safeguards about future services for 
passengers from outside London…The creation of this joint initiative 
between DfT and TfL allowing greater input to the services from all across 
the region heralds a new era of partnership between national, regional and 
local government (DfT/Mayor of London 2016: 31).  
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Defining and reaching agreement on the geographies at which to plan and operate 
transport services within the London global city-region cannot be divorced from 
profound questions relating to London’s administrative and economic geographies: 
 
People see the sense in TfL being responsible for the main lines coming into 
London.  And that absolutely, again, invites you to say well, is the boundary 
of London right when we’re going to be taking over lines that go way 
outside the political boundaries? It does become rather unstainable. 
Occasionally, if you had the odd line that went over the boundary, it doesn’t 
matter too much, but when it’s wholesale, which is what it will be when 
they’ve transferred all the local routes over to TfL, there’s a point at which 
it’s unsustainable (Conservative London Assembly Member, Authors’ 
interview, 2015). 
 
Responding to the DfT/TfL consultation, South East England Councils (SEEC) 
sought representation on the TfL Board to avoid a ‘democratic deficit’ (Ames 
2016a), amidst concerns that rail devolution would create a ‘two-tier transport 
system’ in which some areas in south east England would become more dependent 
on their proximity to central London to benefit from new investment and services 
(SEEC 2016). The London Boroughs welcomed the proposals, but called for a 
greater say in the governance of new services. Unsurprising, as the Boroughs 
currently fund concessionary travel outside of London; a figure expected to 
increase under a new devolved arrangement (Ames 2016a).  
 
The Shaw Review, published in March 2016 (Shaw 2016), has also been expected 
to influence the governance and functional arrangements for managing rail services 
within and across the London global city-region. The Review was tasked by 
national government to reflect upon the current political devolution agenda in the 
UK, the significant growth in rail passenger numbers and the proposal to devolve 
 98 
 
responsibility within Network Rail to ‘regional units’. Significantly, the final 
recommendations in the Review recognised calls for more devolved transport 
responsibilities outside London, and recommended greater strategic focus upon 
rail in the north of England and a stronger role for local government within the rail 
industry. 
 
If TfL acquired greater devolved responsibility for suburban rail services then 
studies have suggested that the existing infrastructure and rolling stock used on 
south London services would need major upgrades, which Sims et al., (2016) 
estimates could cost £12.3bn. In terms of funding and financing new 
infrastructure, the Centre for London suggests a mix of mechanisms. First, 
government should provide new grant funding, alongside TfL revenue streams and 
additional business tax and other levy contributions. Second, TfL’s commercial 
development team should work with the London Boroughs to ‘exploit’ real estate 
and land development in and around stations earmarked as part of an extended 
London Overground network. Network Rail and the (national) Homes and 
Communities Agency have been working with local authorities to explore 
development opportunities around Network Rail railway stations. While this model 
could, in theory, generate new capital and revenue, history suggests that any new 
investment will only materialise if the state, at different spatial levels, and operating 
through particular governance frameworks, encompassing different public and 
private actors, plays an active managerialist role in fiscal and regulatory terms to 
enable local actors to use entrepreneurial approaches to capture financial value that 
can be used as a source of investment in the new network.  
 
Since the fieldwork for this study was conducted, the UK government has decided 
to adopt a different approach to rail devolution. In the business case Mayor Khan 
submitted to the Transport Secretary, Chris Grayling, Southeastern rail services 
would have been devolved first to TfL, from 2018; an first step towards TfL taking 
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charge of all new franchises and services. However, this proposal was rejected by 
the government, which instead of direct devolution to TfL has announced its 
intention to establish a franchise ‘partnership’ between the DfT, TfL and Kent 
County Council when the new Southeastern franchise is issued: 
 
Having read the Mayor’s business case carefully…I thought, rightly or 
wrongly, that we could deliver the service improvement that TfL was talking 
about by forging a partnership. Crucially, we would involve Kent, because 
this is not a London issue; as this railway runs from London to the south 
coast, we cannot think of the railway system just in terms of London (Chris 
Grayling MP, House of Commons, 6 December 2016, Hansard: Vol 618).  
 
Citing concerns about democratic accountability, and suggesting that “if you live in 
Guildford…why should the Mayor of London be responsible for a train from 
Guildford?”5 (Murphy 2016), the Secretary of State questioned the viability of the 
governability of transport infrastructure within the London global city-region 
under the auspices of devolution to TfL. The publication of a letter written by 
Chris Grayling, in his capacity as a local MP, to Boris Johnson, who himself 
supported rail devolution when Mayor, gives a sense of the rationale behind 
Grayling’s decision as Transport Secretary not to proceed with devolution. In the 
2013 letter, Grayling indicated that he could not support devolution to TfL 
because he was opposed to a future Labour Party mayor gaining control of local 
transport services (Mason 2016). 
 
Responding to the government’s announcement, Mayor Khan said: 
 
The only proven way of improving services for passengers is giving control 
of suburban rail lines to TfL. This is why the government and previous 
                                                          
5 Guildford in Surrey, outside the GLA boundary, would be defined as being within the geography of the London 
global city-region.  
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Mayor published a joint prospectus earlier this year. There is cross-party 
support for this from MPs, assembly members, councils inside and out of 
London and businesses and their representatives…We will keep pushing the 
government to deliver the rail devolution they have promised and that is 
needed (Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, ‘Statement from the Mayor of 
London’, 6 December 2016). 
 
Whatever the future of rail devolution, the direction of travel envisaged in early 
2016 has since shifted and attempts to strengthen the managerialist approach to 
transport infrastructure funding and financing through greater local state control of 
sub-urban rail transport services, via TfL, have stalled. The perceived challenge of 
governing transport infrastructure in a global city-region is cited as a reason for 
rejecting direct rail devolution to London. Instead, governance of the new 
franchise services will be determined by national government in the form of a 
partnership framework comprising DfT, TfL and local state actors; heralding a 
‘push-back’ by the national state, using existing regulatory functions to determine 
how aspects of the local state should be governed and how critical urban 
infrastructure is planned, funded, financed and operated. The continued and 
disproportionate interventions and involvement by national government in the 
direct governance of London continues (Tomaney 2001). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the governance of urban infrastructure funding and 
financing in global city-regions, drawing upon analysis of transport infrastructure 
in the London global city-region. Assembling funding and financing for investment 
in infrastructure renewal and development has become a critical focus and site for 
the agency of national and local state and private actors embroiled in and wrestling 
with the ungovernability of global city-regions. The central arguments are 
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threefold. First, in the context of the global financial crisis, uneven economic 
recovery and austerity, national and local state actors are being compelled into 
increasing entrepreneurial and speculative activities and forms of urban governance 
to locate and anchor new sources of capital, develop ‘innovative’ new instruments 
and models to capture value from growth, and adapt existing institutional 
arrangements in ongoing attempts to fund and finance urban infrastructure. 
Second, the particular nature of global city-regions and their continued expansion 
and growth has fomented infrastructure overload, and their dominant positions 
within their national political-economies have amplified the ungovernability 
problem. Third, urban entrepreneurialism in the global city-region has been fuelled 
and extended through the financialisation of urban infrastructure but not in 
isolation because financialisation is being mixed with urban managerialism in 
efforts to address the ungovernability of the global city-region.   
 
Global city-regions are particular cases because of their unique international 
position, their expansion and growth trajectories, and roles and relationships within 
host national economies. Their typically fragmented local jurisdictions hamper the 
strategic planning and governance of extended metropolitan areas, generating 
inherent challenges in assembling entrepreneurial and managerialist infrastructure 
funding and financing packages involving local, national and international public 
and private actors and institutions.  
 
With its dominant role and position within the UK political economy and 
particular history of urban evolution and administration, tthe governance of 
infrastructure funding and financing in the London global city-region has been 
continually re-shaped by a distinct set of state and private capital institutional 
relationships and arrangements, operating across a range of geographical scales. 
Drawing upon empirical analysis of the London global city-region and its transport 
infrastructure, several wider conclusions can be drawn. First, there is said to be 
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chronic and enduring ‘ungovernability’ within global city-regions. The analysis of 
London supports the argument that governing global city-regions is problematic 
and challenging because they are complex economic, social and spatial entities 
(Storper 2014). At the same time, places such as London have been successful 
economically despite the problematic urban governance. Issues become acute in 
global city-regions that are expanding because of increases in population, rising 
employment and intensifying pressures on existing infrastructure and land use. The 
London case study demonstrates how such concerns are amplified in situations of 
economic renaissance as national and local state and private actors seek to arrest, 
reverse and catch-up from episodes of urban decline, under-investment and deal 
with resurgent growth amidst outdated and creaking infrastructures, and cope with 
inequality and polarisation across the city-region (Sassen 1991). In global city-
regions, such as London, which have disjointed and fragmented governance 
systems across a wide functional economic area, assembling and maintaining long-
term infrastructure investment in the absence of a strategic spatial planning 
framework across the city-region level is problematic. Governance in the global 
city-region of London is characterised by multiple governance units, both inside 
London and in the wider travel-to-work-area, numerous of which were created on 
an ad hoc and incremental basis, and some for project-specific reasons. As 
London’s growth is redrawing and extending the economic-geographical footprint 
of the city and city-region, shifting demands in employment and housing are 
redrawing the geographies of transport infrastructure needs as new pressures 
emerge on urban and sub-urban land use. In the absence of formal city-region-
wide planning and governance architectures, fragile institutional coalitions are 
being invented and mobilised. Some are drawing TfL into an unequal relationship 
with local governments and LEPs endowed with limited capacity and resources. 
Such fragmented governance is functional to TfL in its articulation of 
ungovernability as a rationale to acquire greater control over transport networks 
and services beyond its current geographical reach. But TfL finds itself constrained 
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by the current administrative geography of London, and a national government 
committed to retain influence and the means to regulate and intervene in the 
governance of infrastructure planning, investment and operations in the city-region 
because of London’s critical contribution to the national economy. The lack of a 
city-region wide spatial planning framework and hostility towards developing one 
is encouraging greater informal governance and deal-making in local development 
and planning, resulting in ad hoc trade-offs and transactional fixes negotiated 
between different public and private actors. Any benefits of longer-term strategic 
planning are lost as a result. 
 
The search for new sources of infrastructure funding and financing is serving to 
rework governance arrangements through the engagement of state and private 
actors at the international, national and local levels. Under certain circumstances, 
ungovernability enables more speculative and financialised urban infrastructure 
development as investors can play-off local state institutions against each other in 
order to secure the best deals and potential returns on investments. In other areas, 
ungovernability creates disincentives as private actors price the cost of risk and 
finance higher because of perceived institutional and regulatory instability and 
uncertainty. A central dilemma for national and local state actors is how to capture 
more of the value of London’s growth through enlarging the tax base and 
leveraging more tax revenues from residential and commercial real estate and land 
development activity, especially with rising values, to re-invest in transport 
infrastructure projects.  
 
Second, global city-regions, such as London, act as a magnet and laboratory for 
experimental financialisation due to their size, growth prospects and infrastructural 
needs and the potential returns these offer to private investors. But despite their 
draw for entrepreneurial, speculative and financialised forms of urbanism there 
remains a continued and integral role for a reworked state at the national and city-
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regional scales. There is a contradiction between, on the one hand, urban state 
actors being encouraged to adopt ‘innovative’ and speculative financialised 
approaches as part of urban entrepreneurial strategies and policies, heightening risk 
and uncertainty in austerity and uneven economic recovery. And on the other 
hand, the persistence of urban managerialism and its mixing with 
entrepreneurialism because of the particular nature of urban infrastructure and the 
magnification of its scale, construction risk, regulatory, capital intensive and long-
term attributes and ramifications in global city-regions. National state actors 
remain integral as the only entities able credibly to underwrite and/or guarantee 
borrowing at the required scales in the context of the international investment 
community and revenue retention to provide private actors with confidence and 
surety to invest in long-term urban infrastructure. The current and previous 
Mayors of London and TfL have articulated demands to national government 
from various public and private actors that London is given greater direct devolved 
public control over sub-urban rail services. In the UK, elements of the mixing of 
entrepreneurial and managerial urbanism are evident within a highly-centralised 
governance system in which national state actors still seek to intervene and exercise 
fiscal, regulatory and political control over the ‘national champion’ London global 
city-region given its weight within the national political-economy.  
 
The conceptual position is that financialisation is an uneven, negotiated and messy 
process unfolding in differentiated ways in particular geographical and temporal 
contexts (O’Brien and Pike 2018). The role of state actors at different scales has 
been reinforced rather than reduced in the context of the financialisation of 
infrastructure and its uneven transformation into an asset class because of its 
particular form and nature, amplified in the global city-region setting. Whilst the 
national state retains a pivotal role, national, sub-national and local state actors are 
looking to lever in new private capital, using both new and adapted mechanisms 
and practices, some of which are increasingly financialised and hybrid in nature. 
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Struggles in dealing with fiscal stress amidst rising state indebtedness and budget 
deficits have generated further pressures for experimentation, innovation and risk 
displacement, albeit constrained by the UK’s centralised and conservative 
governance system. Financialised urban infrastructure often fails to answer the 
critical question of infrastructure funding, however. With an apparent wealth of 
international global capital wanting to invest in infrastructure (Preqin 2016), 
particularly in growing global city-regions such as London, how the state and/or 
consumers ultimately pay – either through taxation and/or user fees – for 
infrastructure is often hidden or given limited attention often because of political 
concerns about increasing state borrowing and raising taxes or user fees. 
 
Third, under certain conditions, traditional and tried-and-tested funding and 
financing models are being revived and brought together with newer approaches in 
hybrid packages rather than the wholesale invention of new and innovative 
mechanisms to fund and finance infrastructure. In the London global city-region, 
growth and national government political strategies to reduce national public 
indebtedness through austerity are forcing the Mayor of London, London 
Boroughs and TfL to consider mixed and varied approaches to infrastructure 
funding and financing in transport and, where possible, to link transport more 
closely to wider and priority employment and housing strategies and programmes. 
Reworking elements of urban managerialism, many of the mechanisms and 
practices proposed to deliver new transport infrastructure investment are 
instruments that were available to and used by previous institutional incarnations 
of the GLA and TfL. Emergent and new funding and financing packages are 
evident, revealing innovation and adaptation in the current economic, social and 
political setting. 
 
Simultaneously, despite London’s relative political autonomy, the UK’s centralised 
governance structure continues to limit the strategic fiscal and regulatory space and 
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capacity of London and other UK cities and city-regions to devise and implement 
financial packages for new and renewed infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
politically-damaging and costly experience of particular forms of private and quasi-
private transport infrastructure investment, ownership and management, such as  
London Underground PPP, has reduced the appetite and options for exclusive 
private investment in critical transport infrastructure, and made national and city 
government actors in London reluctant to pursue similar ventures. Given the risks 
and uncertain financial returns associated with large-scale transport engineering 
projects, such as Crossrail, the national state is required to underwrite investment, 
particularly at the initial stages of infrastructure projects, in order to encourage 
private actors to invest and reap the returns to pay for the financing of the 
investment in the later and more lucrative operational stages. Connecting urban 
entrepreneurialism and managerialism, this situation reinforces the interdependent 
and mutual relationship between public and private actors in large-scale, grand 
projet-type infrastructure in global city-regions.   
 
Fourth, global city-regions are critical sites of investment for national growth and 
economic recovery in a period of austerity, amidst rising international inter-urban 
competition for investment, economic activities, jobs, people and new flagship 
events and projects. As national economic ‘champions’ (Crouch and Le Galès 
2012), global city-regions are regarded as the drivers of national economies, and 
facilitators or gatekeepers of international investment to other national cities and 
regions. They act as a magnet for international and national state and private 
investment and resources. Global city-regions are also major generators of tax 
revenues for national exchequers, and central to redistributive fiscal transfers 
within national economies. However, as ungovernability intersects with the 
demands of growth and expansion in global city-regions such as London, claims 
for retaining greater shares of locally generated tax revenues are putting national 
redistributive systems under stress. The purpose and effectiveness of equalisation 
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mechanisms transferring public resources between richer and poorer areas are 
being openly questioned. As city actors strive to gain greater fiscal control to 
construct financial packages for infrastructure programmes, numerous may be 
tempted to engage in aggressive modes of intra-national tax competition to attract 
new forms of investment. But, at the same time, city actors are mindful of the 
importance of balancing greater fiscal autonomy with the scope to increase or 
create new tax instruments to raise the revenues needed to fund critical urban 
infrastructure assets and systems. Urban development strategies geared too far in 
favour of tax incentives for private developers and infrastructure investors risk 
reducing the fiscal space that actors require to generate and recycle local tax 
revenues constantly to (re)invest in what appear to be continuously rising demands 
for urban infrastructure and the built environment.  
 
Fifth, concentrated investment in global city-regions, particularly in infrastructure, 
risks undermining national and local state efforts at national spatial rebalancing. 
The domestic environments in which global city-regions reside remain critical (Hall 
and Pain 2006), even though there is evidence that they are ‘de-coupling’ from 
national economies (McCann 2016), since they still retain a unique position and 
status within a centralised political economy like the UK and articulate strong 
claims upon public and private resources with implications for the rest of the 
national economy and polity. The cost of transport infrastructure projects in 
London is significantly higher than elsewhere in the UK (HM Treasury 2010), and 
the growth and expansion of the London global city-region is fuelling seemingly 
ever-greater demands for new investment in transport, housing, communications 
and water infrastructure systems. The funds to pay for such investments have to be 
found from either tax-payers or consumers from across the UK. Especially in 
times of austerity, national governments have to make difficult political choices 
about where to invest public money, and if and how investment will help to create 
 108 
 
economic, social and/or environmental ‘returns’, and on what basis will the value 
of these returns be calculated in spatial terms.  
 
The UK national state, London government and private interests have 
(re)constructed and sustained a geographically-biased national infrastructure 
narrative with a particular sub-national imperative that prioritises the infrastructure 
demands and needs of the London global city-region as the main route to national 
economic competitiveness, growth and recovery. This is because of the London 
global city-region’s dominant size, weight and power in the UK’s political-economy 
and variegation of capitalism, and the national importance of its economic 
prosperity and prospects. This aspiration for a UK ‘globally connected’ and 
‘competitive’ through the London global city-region has been reinforced amidst 
the uncertainties of Brexit and the UK’s economic future outside the EU. 
Entrenched and persistent geographical disparities in city infrastructure provision 
across the rest of the UK are the result. 
 
The UK national state’s geographical bias and emphasis upon the London global 
city-region are mirrored, supported and reinforced by the same spatial inclination 
and reinforcing focus of private infrastructure investors on the larger scale, more 
lucrative and high profile investment opportunities in the same national economic 
core of the London global city-region. While not to the total exclusion of private 
sector investment in other cities and regions in the UK, in a global competition for 
the most lucrative infrastructure investments, those in the London global city-
region are more attractive in the private sector’s search for specific levels of 
returns, risks and maturity profiles. The mutually reinforcing geographical bias and 
supportive inter-relations in city infrastructure investment between the UK state 
and increasingly internationalised private sector are compounding and exacerbating 
the existing geographical disparities in city infrastructure provision and urban and 
regional development across the UK. 
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Limits on public resources, market pressures and political ideologies and strategies 
suggest that further investment will be directed towards the UK’s global city-region 
champion. Yet, in the context of national ambitions for rebalancing and the 
creation of pan-regional ‘powerhouses’ and ‘engines’ elsewhere in the UK, there 
remains no clear understanding and appreciation of whether, when, where and 
how the costs and diseconomies of concentrated urban agglomeration will reach a 
‘tipping point’ disrupting the growth trajectory of London. There is recognition 
amongst local state and private actors that a very strong case will need to be made 
for national government to contribute significant national public funding to major 
transport schemes, such as Crossrail 2. The articulation of such projects as 
‘nationally’ important and significant because of their location in the UK’s 
economic engine by the actors involved is central to this process (London First 
2014). There is recognition too that the case for continued London investment will 
have to be made alongside growing political clamour, and institutional pressure 
from new and emergent city-region authorities and metro-mayors, for national 
government to invest in transport infrastructure in the of the north of England, 
midlands and south west. Given the chronic problem of ungovernability and 
infrastructure overload raising the political-economic pressure wrapped-up in such 
claims, whether and how state actors in the London global city-region will be able 
to continue the appropriation of national resources will be a critical test of national 
state ambitions and strategy for spatial rebalancing in the UK.  
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